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Idealists have long touted the sustainability of harnessing the
sun’s energy to power the needs of modern society.  One very
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attractive way of harnessing solar energy is to use wind turbines
to transfer the energy carried in solar-generated winds to electric
power grids for use by the consuming public.  Wind energy is sus-
tainable because a wind farm uses virtually no fuel to generate
electricity and produces virtually no harmful pollutants.1  Wind
farms do not produce open pit mines, hundred-mile-long oil and
gas pipelines, radioactive waste to be buried in the ground, or
airborne pollutants that harm human health and the natural envi-
ronment.  With increasing awareness and acceptance of climate
change, wind energy will become even more attractive because it
produces virtually no climate-changing compounds.
Wind energy is also quickly becoming economically competi-
tive with traditional power sources.2  The ever-increasing costs of
coal, gas, and oil, coupled with the specter of federal legislation
capping greenhouse-gas emissions, will undoubtedly increase the
economic attractiveness of wind energy in the future.3  Indeed,
wind energy already is cheaper to Colorado consumers, due to
the recent spike in natural-gas prices.4  Once only interesting to
ideological developers looking for green-energy solutions, wind
energy now attracts large, multinational firms and investors, such
as Shell Oil and Goldman Sachs.5
1 See  Roy Fuller, Wind Energy Development on BLM Lands , 24 J. LAND RE-
SOURCES & ENVTL. L. 613, 615 (2004) (discussing the environmental benefits of
wind energy).
2 Michael T. Burr, Windpower: Beyond Boom and Bust , PUB. UTILITIES FORT-
NIGHTLY, May 1, 2005, at 28, 30 (“‘There is a widespread consensus among those at
the firm who focus on the energy sector that wind is one renewable source whose
time has come,’ says Neil Auerbach, managing director with Goldman Sachs in New
York.  ‘We think there is an opportunity here, and a profitable one at that.’”); see
also LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B: RESCUING A PLANET UNDER STRESS AND A CIVI-
LIZATION IN TROUBLE 156-59 (2003) (providing background on the history of wind
energy and predicting that, given current economic factors, wind energy could sub-
stantially reduce global dependence on fossil fuels).
3 See Burr, supra note 2, at 35 (“‘Major utilities are becoming increasingly sophis- R
ticated in their ability to evaluate risks,’ says Ryan Wiser, a scientist with Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratories in Berkeley, Calif. ‘Two risks frequently highlighted in utility
IRPs are natural gas price risk and future carbon regulation. An increasing number
of utilities already are valuing windpower [sic] on its risk-mitigation
characteristics.’”).
4 Matt Jenkins, The Latest Bounce , HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2005, at 3, 3.
5 For example, Shell Wind Energy, Inc., a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell
Group, recently partnered with an American wind-energy firm, Windland, Inc., to
propose a large wind farm in Idaho. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DRAFT ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED COTTEREL WIND POWER PROJECT
ES-3 (2005), available at  http://www.efw.bpa.gov/environmental_services/Docu-
ment_Library/cotterel/ [hereinafter BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., COTTEREL DRAFT
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As a consequence of these economic realities, the landscape of
the windy American West stands to include many more large
wind farms in the near future.  For a wind farm to succeed, it
must be placed in a location with suitable winds and in relative
proximity to transmission lines connecting the site with a utility
grid.6  Many such locations exist on public land managed by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and consequently, private
companies’ interest in developing the wind resources on BLM
lands has increased significantly in recent years.7
Political pressure to develop renewable energy resources on
public lands has also increased recently.  As part of its national
energy policy, the Bush administration has encouraged develop-
ment of wind energy on public lands.8  Based on this national
energy policy, the Department of Energy’s National Renewable
Energy Laboratory has completed a detailed report on the wind-
energy potential of all BLM lands.9  The BLM has also published
a final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)10
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT].  Additionally, Goldman Sachs recently pur-
chased Horizon Wind Energy, a Houston wind-energy developer that now has plans
to develop enough wind farms to produce as much energy as seventeen typical coal-
fired power plants.  David Roberts, You’re a Good Man Lester Brown , GRIST, Mar.
6, 2006, http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/03/06/roberts/.
6 See Michael T. Burr, Wind, Wires & Coal , PUB. UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, May
2005, at 34, 34 (discussing the problem of distance from areas with high-wind poten-
tial to high-use areas in major metropolitan areas and for transmission lines among
the limiting factors for a wind-energy development).
7 See Memorandum from Director, Bureau of Land Mgmt., to All Field Officials
1-2 (Oct. 16, 2002) reprinted in  2 Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
Publ’n No. FES 05-11, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on
Wind Energy Development on BLM-Administered Lands in the Western United
States app. A, at A-3 to -4, available at  http://windeis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/in-
dex.cfm (“The interest in wind energy development has recently increased and new
project proposals on public land have been identified in several States.”).
8 The PEIS states:
The President’s National Energy Policy encourages the development of re-
newable energy resources, including wind energy, as part of an overall
strategy to develop a diverse portfolio of domestic energy supplies for our
future.  The BLM prepared a National Energy Policy Implementation Plan
that included a variety of tasks related to the development of energy re-
sources on the public lands, including renewable energy resource.
Id.  at 1.
9 See generally NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. & BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
Publ’n No. DOE/GO-102003-1794, Assessing the Potential for Renewable Energy
on Public Lands (2003), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy03osti/33530.pdf
(providing a report on the wind-energy potential of BLM lands).
10 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBL’N NO. FES 05-
11, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON WIND EN-
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and Record of Decision11 selecting a programmatic policy to fa-
cilitate wind-energy development.  The emphasis on developing
wind resources on BLM lands comes directly from the Bush ad-
ministration’s national energy policy.12
Despite its idealistic attributes as green power, wind energy
can have serious environmental impacts13 and could become just
as controversial as the use of public lands for traditional extrac-
tive industries.  These environmental concerns could paradoxi-
cally impede development of the most economically feasible
form of green energy available today, particularly on public lands
that have both valuable wind-energy potential and valuable con-
servation and recreational attributes.
Part I of this Comment will briefly describe the impacts of
wind-energy development on the environment and provide an
overview of the BLM’s programmatic wind-energy policy.  Part
II will examine the BLM’s legal authorities and duties to regulate
wind-energy developers with mitigation measures that would ad-
equately compensate for environmental harm.
Scrutiny of the BLM’s approach to mitigation reveals that the
BLM is not currently planning to exercise its full authority to
mitigate the potentially significant impacts of wind-energy devel-
opment on public lands.  By implementing a more progressive
program, the BLM could avoid costly litigation and decrease po-
tential controversy over wind-energy development on public
lands.
ERGY DEVELOPMENT ON BLM-ADMINISTERED LANDS IN THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES [hereinafter BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT].  A full copy of the multi-volume Final Programmatic
EIS is available at http://windeis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/index.cfm.
11 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECI-
SION: IMPLEMENTATION OF WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ASSOCI-
ATED LAND USE PLAN AMENDMENTS (2005), available at  http://windeis.anl.gov/
documents/docs/WindPEISROD.pdf [hereinafter BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RE-
CORD OF DECISION].
12 See id.  at 4-5 (summarizing the BLM’s responses to the wind-energy policy di-
rectives of the Bush administration).
13 See Fuller, supra  note 1, at 616-18 (noting the “paradox” of wind energy as R
environmentally beneficial and harmful); see also infra  Part I.A (discussing the envi-
ronmental impacts of wind energy).
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I
THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
WIND-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON BLM LANDS AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR MITIGATION
A. The Environmental Impacts of Wind Energy
Wind energy is generally seen as green power.14  However,
marketable wind energy in the West is found only in undevel-
oped rural areas where the impacts can cause significant conflicts
with local residents and resource users, as well as environmental
groups concerned about impacts to wildlife.15
1. Aesthetic and Other Non-Wildlife Impacts
The footprint a wind farm leaves on the land can be significant
in undeveloped areas valued for their scenic attributes.16  The
footprint can include turbines, structures, power stations, roads,
new transmission lines, and even on-site concrete-batching
plants.17  Construction requires digging and blasting holes for
tower foundations thirty-five to forty feet deep and pouring doz-
ens of cubic yards of concrete per turbine.18  Developers must
also clear and compact up to three acres for a “staging area” to
erect each turbine.19  Even after on-site mitigation and restora-
tion measures, construction and maintenance of the facilities
leaves a footprint of five percent to ten percent of the acreage of
the entire site for the life of the project.20  Construction of roads
to access the site also creates a significant footprint and a perma-
14 See  Fuller, supra  note 1, at 615-16 (discussing the environmental benefits of R
wind energy).
15 See 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-35 to -36 (indicating where marketable wind R
resources exist on BLM lands in the West and describing potential ecological im-
pacts of wind energy).  See infra  Part I.A.1 for background on conflicts with other
land users.
16 See 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra  note 10, at 3-3 to -11 (describing the construction phase of R
a wind-energy project).
17 Id.  at 3-3 to -5.  During the construction phase, a concrete-batch plant could
have a footprint of up to ten acres. Id.  at 3-5.
18 Id.
19 Id.  at 3-4.
20 Id.  While most of the structures are removed after the project is decommis-
sioned decades later, some concrete foundations will always remain. See id. at 3-11
to -12 (turbine foundations, for example, would be left in place).
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nent alteration of a previously undeveloped area.21  This can cre-
ate significant environmental impacts including landscape
degradation, unfavorable aesthetics, and noise, all of which can
engender local opposition.22
Wind-farm footprints can significantly degrade the land-
scape.23  In the past, groups have opposed wind farms in an effort
to stop the industrialization of rural landscapes.24  Of all the im-
pacts to a rural landscape caused by wind farms, extensive road
building can be the most significant.25  If existing roads cannot be
used, developers must remove massive amounts of soil and con-
struct roads in hilly terrain typical of most wind-farm sites.26
Such construction permanently scars the landscape.  Extensive
road construction and use can also cause fugitive dust to escape
into the air, degrading air quality and visibility.27  The footprint
could also negatively affect cultural resources and values that the
land may contain.28
Many people are also opposed to the aesthetic impairment of
the landscape caused by a large group of wind turbines.29  Wind
farms are often industrial in appearance, a characteristic that is
incompatible with natural landscapes typical of BLM lands.30
While efforts can be made to blend turbines with the surrounding
rural area, some people still find large, modern wind turbines of-
21 Id.  at 3-4.
22 See  Fuller, supra note 1, at 618-21 (discussing the impacts of wind-energy de- R
velopment, including landscape degradation, aesthetics, and noise).
23 Id. at 618.
24 Id.
25 See id.  (noting the potential significant impacts of new road construction).
26 See  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra  note 10, at 3-3 (describing potential site changes necessary R
for wind-farm construction).  For example, analysis of one wind-farm proposal for
BLM land in Idaho could require cutting 2.66 million cubic yards of soil and filling
2.5 million cubic yards of road fill material to construct twenty-two miles of new
roads and reconstruct 4.5 miles of existing road. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., COT-
TEREL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 2-27; see also R
id. at 2-32, 2-40 (describing the potentially diminished impacts of road construction
with other alternatives).
27 See  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-15 (noting that road construction can impact R
air quality). See also id.  at 5-91 (explaining that dust can impact visual resources
during site construction).
28 Id.  at 5-99 to -102.
29 Fuller, supra note 1, at 619-20. R
30 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-92. R
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fensive.31  On BLM lands, these visual impacts can be especially
difficult to avoid with mitigation measures because turbines are
large and cannot be hidden easily in open spaces that are typical
of BLM land.32
The construction and operation of modern wind farms can also
produce offensive levels of noise in rural areas.33  Construction
activities pose the largest potential for high levels of noise be-
cause of heavy equipment, traffic, and blasting through geologic
formations to dig the foundations for turbine towers.34  Due to
recent advances in the design of turbines, mechanical noise is
minimal during power generation.35  However, the turbines cre-
ate a low level of unavoidable aerodynamic noise that can be of-
fensive to people in the area.36  Substations and transmission
lines also create low-level noise that may exceed background-
noise levels near the facility.37
These non-wildlife impacts could cause an unacceptable level
of environmental harm for local residents and resource users, en-
gendering significant local opposition of wind-energy develop-
ment on BLM lands much as they have on non-BLM lands.38
2. Ecological and Wildlife Impacts
Wind turbines and their supporting roads and structures can
also have significant ecological impacts in sensitive locations.
Perhaps the most commonly recognized impact of wind-energy
31 Fuller, supra note 1, at 619-20. R
32 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-92. R
33 See id.  at 5-20 to -27 (discussing the potential for noise impacts); see also  Fuller,
supra note 1, at 620-21 (noting that those who live within hearing distance of wind R
turbines often find the noise objectionable).
34 See  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-20 to -22 (describing noise impacts from vari- R
ous activities).
35 Id. at 5-23.
36 EJA PEDERSEN & HÖGSKOLAN I HALMSTAD, SWEDISH ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
PUBL’N NO. 5308, NOISE ANNOYANCE FROM WIND TURBINES: A REVIEW 10 (2003),
available at  http://www.naturvardsverket.se/bokhandeln/pdf/620-5308-6.pdf.  At high
wind speeds the noise of the wind itself can make this aerodynamic noise im-
perceptible.  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, supra  note 10, at 5-24. R
37 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-25 to -26.
38 See Fuller, supra note 1, at 617 (discussing the “not in my backyard” response R
to wind-energy proposals, including opposition to a large wind farm in the Nan-
tucket Sound).
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development is direct avian mortality caused by wind turbines
and transmission lines.39  However, extensive wind-energy devel-
opment also has the potential to fragment habitat used by some
species, which could eventually pose a problem as significant as
direct avian mortality on BLM lands.40
Direct avian mortality occurs when birds fly directly into tur-
bines and other structures or are struck by rotating turbine
blades.41  The rate of mortality is generally related to the abun-
dance of individual species that inhabit or migrate through the
site.42  The site itself can attract birds and thereby increase the
abundance of birds at a site.43  Increased burrowing and foraging
opportunities for rodents and other prey species can occur when
cover is increased by rocks removed from underground during
construction and piled on-site.44  The increase in rodents and
prey species attracts raptors and other predatory birds that find
the wind turbines and other structures to be useful perching
sites.45  If the area is used for grazing, cattle often congregate
near turbines and attract insects and other raptor prey with their
waste.46
A wind farm can also degrade valuable habitat used by some
species.  As discussed above, the wind farm’s footprint includes
many elements, all of which increase human activity and back-
ground noises at a site.  Human activity can create enough noise
to discourage many terrestrial species.47  The area surrounding
the permanent and temporary footprint can become degraded
39 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-53 (indicating that “the presence of, or collisions R
with, facility structures probably represent the greatest potential hazard to wild-
life”); see also id. at 5-57 to -58, 5-59 tbl.5.9.9-3, 5-60 tbl.5.9.9-4, 5-62 to -66, 5-67
tbl.5.9.3-5, 5-68 & tbl.5.9.9-6 (providing statistics on avian and bat mortality at ex-
isting wind-energy developments).
40 See id.  at 5-73 (noting that wind-energy development could curtail the range of
several gallinaceous bird species).
41 Id. at 5-57, 5-62.  Turbines and transmission lines can also kill bats that fly into
them. Id.  at 5-63.
42 Id.  at 5-58.
43 Id. at 5-57.
44 Id. at 5-57, 5-64.
45 Id. at 5-53, 5-64.
46 Id.  at 5-57, 5-65.
47 See id. at 5-56 to -57 (citing scientific studies indicating that noise from wind
turbines decreases the abundance of terrestrial bird species in the immediate vicinity
and noting that noise from other human activities is likely to disturb other wildlife).
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habitat for many species.48  Additionally, if the species requires
large tracts of undisturbed habitat, fragmentation of that habitat
by a wind-energy development can be a significant barrier to mi-
gration.49  Further compounding the impact on habitat, construc-
tion of electricity transmission lines will be necessary to access
remote sites on BLM lands.50  Indeed, the BLM recently pro-
vided the public with notice that it intends to complete a “West-
Wide Energy Corridor Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement” to authorize installation of additional transmission
lines.51  The footprint and noise associated with transmission-line
development necessary for wind-energy developments will only
compound the habitat impacts to terrestrial species.
a. Altamont Pass Wind Resource Area: An Example of
Extreme Avian Mortality
The Altamont Pass Wind Resource Area (Altamont) in central
California has been a lightning rod for criticism and demon-
strates the negative image created by a poorly planned wind-en-
ergy development.  Altamont is criticized for its direct avian
mortalities, particularly among charismatic raptor species such as
48 See id. at 5-56 (“In some instances, turbines, transmission lines, and other facil-
ity structures may interfere with behavioral activities, including migratory move-
ments, and may provide additional perch sites for raptors, thereby increasing
predatory levels on other wildlife (such as small mammals and birds).”).
49 As the PEIS notes:
The presence of a wind energy project could disrupt movements of terres-
trial wildlife, particularly during migration.  Herd animals, such as elk,
deer, and pronghorn antelope, could potentially be affected if rows of tur-
bines are placed along migration paths between winter and summer ranges
or in calving areas.  However, studies conducted at Foote Creek Rim in
Wyoming have not demonstrated any displacement effects on pronghorn
antelope, and antelope use of the area has not declined since construction
of the wind energy project.  The wind energy development project and as-
sociated transmission lines and access roads would be maintained as areas
of low vegetation that may hinder or prevent movements of some wildlife
species.
Id. at 5-72 (citations omitted).
50 See Burr, supra note 6, at 34 (“securing transmission capacity to remote areas” R
can be a major impediment to wind-energy development).
51 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,
Amend Relevant Agency Land Use Plans, Conduct Public Scoping Meetings, and
Notice of Floodplain and Wetlands Involvement, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,647 (Sept. 28,
2005).  As of March 2007, the BLM had not yet finalized the Draft EIS.  Details and
updates on the process are available at http://corridoreis.anl.gov/index.cfm.
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golden eagles.52  Altamont is located in a prime raptor flyway.53
Predatory birds use the site’s ample perching sites54 to hunt prey
species attracted to the facility.55  Consequently, the rotating tur-
bine blades regularly kill considerable numbers of raptors and
other birds, including an estimated seventy-five golden eagles per
year.56  Groups opposed to the current management practices at
Altamont include the Center for Biological Diversity, the
Golden Gate Audubon Society, and the California Energy Com-
mission.57  Even the conservative Cato Institute has recognized
Altamont’s severe impact on raptors.58  As a result of those im-
pacts, the Center for Biological Diversity filed a lawsuit against
the wind-energy companies operating Altamont for violations of
state and federal wildlife protection laws.59
Opposition to the significant avian mortalities at Altamont and
the resulting press coverage has ultimately hampered develop-
ment of more suitable wind-energy sites elsewhere.60  This is un-
52 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Altamont Pass Wind Resource Area, http://
www.sw-center.org/swcbd/programs/bdes/altamont/altamont.html (last visited Nov.
25, 2006) (providing a detailed background and critique of the Altamont Wind Re-
source Area); see also 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-64 (citing several studies on R
direct avian mortality at Altamont).
53 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 52 (explaining that Altamont is R
located along a prime migratory bird route in an area with a high incidence of
raptors).
54 See  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-53 (explaining that wind-energy structures can R
provide birds of prey with perching areas).
55 Id.  at 5-64.
56 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 52 (“[E]ach year, Altamont Pass R
wind turbines kill an estimated 881 to 1,300 birds of prey, including more than 75
golden eagles, several hundred red-tailed hawks, several hundred burrowing owls,
and hundreds of additional raptors including American kestrels, great horned owls,
ferruginous hawks, and barn owls.”); see also 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-64 R
(study “estimat[ing] that there were 400 to 800 golden eagle, 2,980 to 5,960 red-
tailed hawk, and 2,700 to 5,400 burrowing owl fatalities at the Altamont Pass WRA
from 1983 to 2003”).
57 See generally Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 52 (detailing various R
groups’ agitations against Altamont permit renewals).
58 See  Robert L. Bradley, Jr., Cato Policy Analysis No. 280, Renewable Energy:
Not Cheap, Not “Green” (Aug. 27, 1997), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-280.html
(discussing the issue of avian mortality in the text accompanying notes 88-92).
59 Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity et al., Alameda County to Approve
Flawed Permits for Altamont Pass Wind Farms This Week (Sept. 21, 2005), http://
www.sw-center.org/swcbd/press/altamont9-21-05.pdf.
60 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 52 (“According to wind industry R
reports, the fiasco at Altamont Pass has hampered wind power development, as un-
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fortunate because Altamont’s extreme impacts are largely
unique.61  Ultimately, Altamont exemplifies what can happen
when environmental concerns are disregarded.
b. The Potential Habitat Impacts to Imperiled Sage Grouse
While the severe avian mortalities of Altamont might be ex-
treme, many facilities placed on BLM lands will have more sub-
tle, but potentially significant, impacts on habitat for imperiled
sage-grouse populations.  Sage grouse are a terrestrial bird spe-
cies that inhabit the sagebrush steppe, much of which is land
managed by the BLM.62  The BLM estimates that sage grouse
have declined by thirty-three percent in the past thirty to forty
years.63  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that sage-
grouse populations have declined as much as ninety-nine percent
since European settlement.64  The BLM has identified the loss of
un-fragmented sagebrush habitat as one of the main causes of the
decline in sage grouse.65  Given that approximately fifty percent
resolved concerns about impacts to birds resulted in delays or discontinuation of
other wind facilities.”); see also Bradley, supra note 58 (text accompanying note 92 R
emphasizes that the Altamont experience could significantly hinder wind-power
development).
61 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 52 (“Wind turbines at the Al- R
tamont Pass Wind Resource Area (APWRA) kill more birds of prey than any other
wind facility in North America. . . .”).
62 The PEIS provides a good summation of the natural history of sage grouse and
the potential impacts of wind-energy projects. See  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FI-
NAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-73 R
(sage-grouse habitat and wind-energy projects).  More detailed information on sage
grouse and more general management concerns are available in BLM’s Guidance
for the Management of Sagebrush Plant Communities for Sage Grouse-Conservation .
See generally BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Guidance for
the Management of Sagebrush Plant Communities for Sage-Grouse Conservation in
NATIONAL SAGE-GROUSE CONSERVATION STRATEGY (2004), available at  http://
www.blm.gov/nhp/spotlight/sage_grouse/docs/Sage-Grouse_Strategy_1_4_1.pdf
[hereinafter BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush
Plant Communities] (providing guidance on managing, restoring, and enhancing
sagebrush habitat on public lands).
63 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush Plant
Communities , supra note 62, at 7. R
64 Ninety-Day Finding for Petitions to List the Greater Sage-Grouse as
Threatened or Endangered, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,484, 21,486 (April 21, 2004).
65 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush Plant
Communities , supra note 62, at 6-8 (discussing changes and threats to sagebrush R
habitat that have contributed to the decline of the sage grouse).  The PEIS indicates
that a single sage-grouse population can inhabit in excess of 1000 square miles annu-
ally.  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-73. R
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of the remaining sage-grouse habitat is managed by the BLM, the
Agency recognizes that its management activities could have sig-
nificant impacts on the future of sage grouse.66  The BLM has
stated its sage-grouse-management goal is to: “Sustain or reest-
ablish the integrity of the sagebrush biome to provide the
amount, continuity, and quality of habitat that is necessary to
maintain sustainable populations of sage grouse and other sage-
brush-dependent wildlife species.”67
Extensive wind-energy development may be incompatible with
this goal.  Invasive grasses and the frequent fire cycles they cause
are the main source of degradation of large tracts of sagebrush,
which does not reestablish itself in frequent fire cycles.68  How-
ever, the BLM also recognizes the threat of habitat fragmenta-
tion caused by energy development on public lands, including
wind-energy development.69  Additionally, sage grouse fre-
quently mate in large groups atop wind-swept ridge lines,70 the
same type of terrain typically suitable for wind-energy develop-
ment.71  The BLM recognizes that extensive wind-energy devel-
opment on BLM lands could seriously impact sage-grouse
populations.72  The decline in sage grouse is indicative of the gen-
66 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-73. R
67 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush Plant
Communities , supra note 62, at 10. R
68 Id.  at 7.
69 Id. at 8.  The PEIS also recognizes the impact of wind energy specifically. See 1
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-73 (“Transmission lines, turbines, and access roads R
may adversely affect habitats important to gallinaceous birds by causing fragmenta-
tion, reducing habitat value, or reducing the amount of habitat available.”).
70 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush Plant
Communities , supra note 62, at 9.  Sage grouse mating sites are referred to as “leks,” R
some of which can support several hundred males in an area encompassing more
than one hundred acres. Id.  The BLM suggested restricting at least one recent
wind-energy proposal due to the existence of a regularly used lek along a ridge pro-
posed for development. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., COTTEREL DRAFT ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at ES-6 to -9 (discussing the BLM’s R
preferred alternative, which would impose additional mitigation measures to protect
sage grouse).
71 See  Karin Kowalski, Windland Windfall? Company Looks to Cotterel Moun-
tains to Harness Wind , TWIN FALLS TIMES-NEWS, Aug. 1, 2004, available at  http://
www.harvestcleanenergy.org/enews/enews_0804/enews_0804_Windland_Windfall.
htm (explaining that the Cotterel Mountains are an ideal wind-turbine site because
of high winds along its ridges).
72 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-73. R
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eral decline in populations of many species dependent upon the
greater sagebrush steppe ecosystem managed by the BLM.73
Consequently, it is not unrealistic to predict the sage-grouse issue
could engender environmental opposition to wind-energy devel-
opment on BLM lands as strong as the opposition to Altamont’s
direct avian mortalities.74
B. The BLM’s Wind-Energy Development Policy and the
Potential for Mitigation
1. The BLM’s Programmatic Wind-Energy Policy
The BLM’s PEIS and the Record of Decision provide insight
into the extent of wind-energy development that can be expected
on public land in the West.  Among the three wind-energy devel-
opment alternatives analyzed in the PEIS, the BLM selected the
maximum-development alternative.75  This alternative envisions
development of all economically developable sites where wind-
energy development will not conflict with prior management des-
ignations, such as wilderness designation.76  The BLM claims that
development may be further restricted on a site-specific basis
when the BLM accepts or denies a plan of development submit-
ted for a right-of-way permit.77  However, as this section will
73 See id.  (expressing concern about the populations of several sagebrush-depen-
dent species).
74 Indeed, at least one major environmental group, the National Wildlife Federa-
tion, has already voiced apprehension toward any wind-energy policy that would
seriously impair the remaining sagebrush habitat.  Letter from Thomas France, Dir.,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, to Wind-Energy Programmatic EIS, Comment Analysis Group,
Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Dec. 10, 2004), reprinted in  3 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra  note 10, at R
594, 594-97.
75 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION, supra  note 11, at 1-3; see R
also  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2-1 to -31 (explaining the three different alternatives). R
76 According to the PEIS:
Lands that will be excluded from wind energy site monitoring and testing
and development include designated areas that are part of the National
Landscape Conservation System (NLCS) (e.g., Wilderness Areas, Wilder-
ness Study Areas, National Monuments, NCAs, Wild and Scenic Rivers,
and National Historic and Scenic Trails) and Areas of Critical Environmen-
tal Concern (ACECs).
1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2-6 to -7. R
77 See id. at 2-7 (“Additional areas of land may be excluded from wind-energy
development on the basis of findings of resource impacts that cannot be mitigated
and/or conflict with existing and planned multiple-use activities or land use plans.”).
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demonstrate, the PEIS and the Record of Decision contemplate
development virtually wherever it is economically feasible.
Whether the BLM will impose future restrictions to protect re-
source values remains to be seen.
While future conflicts with resource values could theoretically
prevent development of some economically viable sites, the
PEIS provides two economic models that predict the lands likely
to be economically viable.  The “maximum potential develop-
ment scenario” (MPDS) model predicts the acreage of BLM land
that has economically profitable wind speeds and is not located
in an area restricted from development.78  The “Wind Deploy-
ment System” (WinDS) model further limits the scale of devel-
opment by considering economic factors that are likely to limit
development in the next twenty years.79  Those factors include
access to and cost of transmission capacity, the irregularity of
wind energy, wind technology limitations, and other potential ec-
onomic barriers.80  Of the 174.7 million acres of land the BLM
manages in the eleven western states analyzed, the MPDS model
predicts that 20,634,000 acres possess economically viable wind
speeds and are not already restricted from development.81  The
WinDS model predicts that 160,100 acres could be developed in
the next twenty years considering economic factors affecting
wind energy.82  For context, when the PEIS was completed in
2005, three operating wind-energy developments totaling 21,161
acres operated on BLM land,83 and there were another three
This requirement was incorporated verbatim into the Record of Decision. BUREAU
OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 11, at A-2. R
78 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2-2 to -3.  The MPDS model was constructed by the R
National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Id. at 2-2. The model considers lands
with Class Three winds, on a scale from one to seven, to be economically viable over
the next twenty years. Id.  at 2-2 to -3.
79 Id. at 2-3.  Like the MPDS model, the WinDS model was constructed by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2-5 tbl.2.2.1-1.  The eleven states included in the analysis are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming. Id.
82 Id.  California and Nevada possess the most economically developable acres,
with 72,300 acres and 34,700 acres respectively. Id.  Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, and
Oregon each also possess in excess of 9000 acres of economically developable land.
Id.
83 The three operating wind-energy sites on BLM lands are the San Gorgonio Pass
Area in California on 3187 acres; the Tehachapi Pass Area in California on 900
acres; and the Wyoming Wind Project located near Arlington, Wyoming.  The Wyo-
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pending wind-energy development proposals totaling 17,180
acres.84
In the Record of Decision, the BLM selected the maximum-
development alternative, which envisions the possibility of devel-
oping any proposed site within the MPDS model.85  It also estab-
lishes a minimum level of best-management practices (BMPs)
applicable to each wind-energy project to decrease the negative
impacts of the wind-energy developments.86  The maximum-de-
velopment alternative requires each project to incorporate the
baseline BMPs into a plan of development that the BLM must
approve with a right-of-way authorization before a developer can
legally begin construction.87  However, the BMPs adopted in the
Record of Decision do not preclude the use of any site at this
point, even if a site does contain sensitive ecological resources.88
Instead, the BMPs emphasize on-site measures and adaptive
management to lessen the impact of the facility, essentially ignor-
ming Wind Project occupies one 950-acre tract and one 16,124-acre tract of BLM
land. Id.  at 2-38 to -30.
84 The three pending proposed wind-energy developments were the Table Moun-
tain Wind Generating Facility in Nevada on 4500 acres, the Cotterel Mountain Wind
Farm Project in Idaho on 4480 acres, and the Walker Ridge Project in California on
8200 acres. Id.  at 2-30.
85 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 11, at 1-3. R
86 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2-6; see also id.  at 2-6 to -24 (providing a detailed R
explanation of these BMPs).  The BMPs are also available in the Record of Deci-
sion. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 11, at A-1 to - R
20.
87 See  1 Bureau of Land Mgmt., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2-2 (explaining that additional stipulations will R
be incorporated into the plan of development and the right-of-way authorization), 2-
9 (indicating that under the maximum development alternative, developers must in-
corporate the BMPs into each plan of development).  The BLM authorizes wind-
energy developments through right-of-way authorizations in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the BLM’s Interim Wind Energy Development Policy. Id.
at 2-1; see also BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 11, at R
1-2.  BLM’s Interim Wind Energy Development Policy can be found in the PEIS.
See  2 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at app. A (providing the BLM’s Interim Wind Energy R
Development Policy).  Right-of-way authorization is governed by subchapter V of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. See generally  43 U.S.C.
§§ 1761-1770 (2006).
88 See  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2-11 (proposed BMP would prohibit meteoro- R
logical towers in sensitive habitats or in areas where ecological resources are known
to be sensitive to human activities).  However, sites with existing resource conflicts,
such as wilderness designations, are definitively precluded from development. See
supra  note 76 and accompanying text. R
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ing the site-selection step of the process.89  In fact, the Record of
Decision does not contain a BMP, or any other requirement, that
would preclude development unless the area has already been
designated for protection.90
In sum, the BLM’s policy leaves the door open for develop-
ment of every economically viable site that is not already pre-
cluded from development.  While the BLM’s figures do not
indicate that a large percentage of total BLM lands will be devel-
oped in the next twenty years,91 it is likely that developers will
propose placing wind farms on more than 100,000 acres of public
lands in the next twenty years.92  At least a few of the wind-en-
ergy developments are likely to be proposed in areas where envi-
ronmental damage could be considerable given the potentially
significant impacts of wind-energy development.  The BMPs at-
tempt to offset any damage exclusively with on-site mitigation
and ignore rejecting a site altogether.  Consequently, some
projects are likely to engender significant opposition if the BLM
does not impose additional restrictions.
2. The Potential for Off-Site Mitigation to Offset Unavoidable
Impacts
While the BLM has made an effort to establish on-site BMPs
that limit environmental harm,93 on-site measures are unlikely to
89 See, e.g. , 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2-12 (“The BLM will prohibit the distur- R
bance of any population of federal listed plant species. . . .  Turbines shall be
configured to avoid landscape features known to attract raptors, if site studies show
that placing turbines there would pose a significant risk to raptors.”).
90 Only one BMP really seems to limit the possible use of a site altogether based
on environmental impacts: “Meteorological towers shall not be located in sensitive
habitats or in areas where ecological resources known to be sensitive to human ac-
tivities (e.g., prairie grouse) are present.” See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD
OF DECISION, supra note 11, at A-6.  If meteorological towers cannot be placed on a R
site, wind-energy development will not occur at the site because the project would
never get past the testing phase.  However, the BLM and project proponents could
read even this BMP as merely restricting where the meteorological tower is placed
at a given site.  The other BMPs focus exclusively on ways to minimize the environ-
mental impacts once a site is selected because they focus on plans of development
preparation, construction, operation, and decommissioning, all of which ignore ac-
tual site selection. See id.  at A-6 to -20.
91 See supra  text accompanying notes 81-82. R
92 See supra  text accompanying note 82. R
93 See  1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FEDERAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-65 to -66 (discussing several ways to “mini- R
mize,” not eliminate, direct avian mortalities).
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completely mitigate environmental harm.94  The BLM may be
able to compensate for the unavoidable ecological impacts with
off-site mitigation.  Indeed, the Washington Department of Fish
and Wildlife recommends that permitting agencies in the state
require off-site mitigation for all land in the state through a set of
guidelines.95  The California Energy Commission has also sug-
gested off-site mitigation as a means to offset the impacts at Al-
tamont.96  Environmental groups concerned about Altamont’s
avian mortality levels approved of off-site mitigation to offset the
impacts at Altamont, indicating off-site mitigation may decrease
the controversy over using public lands for wind-energy
development.97
The BLM has also considered off-site mitigation with regard to
sage-grouse management.  According to the PEIS, off-site miti-
gation could “offset unavoidable sage-grouse habitat alteration
94 See Wally Erickson, Bird Fatality and Risk at New Generation Wind Projects ,
PROC. OF THE WIND ENERGY & BIRDS/BATS WORKSHOP 29, 29-30 (2004), http://
www.awea.org/pubs/documents/WEBBProceedings9.14.04[Final].pdf (indicating
that even wind turbines with the most advanced designs will cause avian mortality).
See also supra notes 47-49, 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the subtle, but R
generally unavoidable, impacts on habitat).
95 WASH. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, WIND POWER GUIDELINES 5-10 (2003),
available at  http://wdfw.wa.gov/hab/engineer/windpower/wind_power_guidelines.
pdf.  Washington’s guidelines would require mitigation by acquiring or protecting
replacement habitat whenever an area with habitat value would be impacted. Id. at
5-6.  If a wind farm would only impact low-value habitat or cropland, Washington’s
guidelines would not require off-site mitigation. Id. ; see also Letter from Jeff P.
Koenings, Dir., Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife (Aug. 23, 2003), available at  http://
wdfw.wa.gov/hab/engineer/windpower/wind_power_dir_ltr.pdf (“[T]he Department
has developed Wind Power Guidelines that achieve ways to reconcile support for
renewable wind power projects with the need to protect wildlife and the State’s
habitat.”); Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Wind Power and Wildlife , FISH & WILD-
LIFE SCI., Sept. 2004, http://wdfw.wa.gov/science/articles/windpower/ (providing ad-
ditional background on the guidelines and indicating that they are not mandatory).
96 At least two reports commissioned by the California Energy Commission have
recommended off-site, compensatory mitigation of unavoidable impacts caused by
Altamont. SHAWN SMALLWOOD & LINDA SPIEGEL, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, ASSESS-
MENT TO SUPPORT AS ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE APWRA 2 (2005),
available at  http://www.sw-center.org/swcbd/programs/bdes/altamont/CEC -assess-
ment-mitigation-plan.pdf; see also K. SHAWN SMALLWOOD & CARL G. THELANDER,
DEVELOPING METHODS TO REDUCE BIRD MORTALITY IN THE ALTAMONT PASS
WIND RESOURCE AREA 347 (2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/
500-04-052/2004-08-09_500-04-052.PDF (recommending purchase of off-site conser-
vation easements as mitigation).
97 Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity et al., supra note 59 (noting that in a R
lawsuit, several environmental groups, including the Center for Biological Diversity,
requested off-site compensation as a remedy for Altamont’s ongoing bird kills).
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and reduction.”98  In order to preserve the remaining sage-grouse
habitat, the BLM has indicated that it intends to “[e]xplore the
use of conservation easements and the acquisition (through
purchase, donation or exchange) of valuable sagebrush habitat
[not managed by the BLM], to maintain, replace or increase
habitat.”99  Thus, the BLM has already contemplated acquiring
non-BLM lands to protect sage grouse through an off-site mitiga-
tion program.  The BLM Sage Grouse Guidance explains a po-
tential off-site mitigation program as follows:
Mitigation actions should be considered in the following prior-
ity: 1) replacing habitats with similar habitats (in-kind/off-site
mitigation), and 2) replacing habitats with other appropriate
habitats, when similar habitats are not available (out-of-kind/
off-site mitigation).  Mitigation should occur within or adja-
cent to occupied or restored habitats.  Off-site mitigation
should eliminate, reduce, or directly alleviate impacts to sage-
grouse habitat.100
One way the BLM could administer an off-site mitigation pro-
gram is to assess developers a mitigation fee that could be used
by resource specialists to locate and protect non-BLM sagebrush
habitat.  The BLM controls half of the remaining sagebrush
habitat suitable for sage grouse.101  By corollary, fifty percent of
the remaining habitat is controlled by private parties or other
federal or state agencies.  Much of the viable habitat remaining
on non-BLM sagebrush lands could be purchased with mitigation
fees to offset the impacts of wind-energy development.  If these
purchases were made by an organized central body they could
achieve substantial, comprehensive conservation benefits.  The
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife adopted a fee-
based mitigation alternative because it “can greatly improve the
habitat value per mitigation dollar as well as provide a more
streamlined and efficient mitigation process for applicants.”102
98 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 5-74. R
99 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush Plant
Communities , supra note 62, at 14. R
100 Id.  at 15.
101 See supra text accompanying note 66. R
102 WASH. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 95, at 9.  Under Washington’s R
program, applicants could select to off-set habitat impacts either by acquiring re-
placement habitat or by paying a mitigation fee for purchase of replacement habi-
tats. Id. at 5-10.
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With regard to determining the proper fees, one study commis-
sioned by the California Energy Commission provided precise
formulas to calculate the proper amount of mitigation fees to off-
set direct avian-mortality impacts.103  Additionally, Washington
State’s mitigation-fee guidelines developed a way to assess fees
based on the value of habitat lost and the cost of replacement
habitat.104  For proposed wind-energy sites where there is no im-
pact to sagebrush habitat (e.g., areas already vegetated with inva-
sive grasses) the fees could be used to purchase or protect
additional non-BLM sagebrush lands, providing a net increase in
sagebrush habitat.
Mitigation fees also could be used to protect other ecological
values.  A mitigation-fee system could thus be adapted to protect
many relevant environmental values, and significantly decrease
opposition to using BLM lands for wind energy.
3. The BLM’s Current Approach to Off-Site Mitigation of
Unavoidable Impacts
While the BLM has recognized the potential usefulness of off-
site mitigation, the Agency has demonstrated a disinterest in re-
quiring off-site mitigation of wind-energy developers.  The BLM
has indicated that its authority to require off-site mitigation to
compensate for the effects of any type of project is limited.105  In
Instruction Memo 2005-069 (BLM Off-Site Mitigation Gui-
dance), a memorandum to state directors and field managers, the
BLM Director outlined the Agency’s general policy of not re-
quiring off-site mitigation in exchange for granting any right-of-
way for access to BLM land to develop energy resources.106  Ac-
cess covered by the BLM Off-Site Mitigation Guidance includes
access to develop oil and gas resources, geothermal energy, wind
103 SMALLWOOD & SPIEGEL, supra note 96, at 13-15. R
104 WASH. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 95, at 9-10. R
105 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush Plant
Communities , supra note 62, at 15 (“BLM’s authority to require off-site mitigation is R
limited.  However, mitigation on a case-by-case basis may be implemented or nego-
tiated with willing project proponents.”).
106 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Dep’t of the Interior, Instruction Memorandum No.
2005-069 from Director, Bureau of Land Mgmt. to All State Directors and Field
Managers 2 (Feb. 1, 2005) reprinted in BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., COTTEREL DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra  note 5, at app. E [hereinafter Bureau R
of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-069].  An electronic, non-
paginated copy of Instruction Memorandum 2005-069 is available at http://
www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy05/im2005-069.htm.
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energy, solar energy, as well as any authorization to place trans-
mission lines on BLM lands.107  In accordance with the BLM’s
general policy for all energy right-of-way authorizations, the
PEIS and the Record of Decision adopt the BLM Off-Site Miti-
gation Guidance’s general policy against requiring off-site mitiga-
tion.108  Although the BLM Off-Site Mitigation Guidance itself
expired on September 30, 2006,109 the BLM has effectively
adopted the document’s policy against requiring off-site mitiga-
tion into the wind-energy development program.
More specifically, the BLM’s off-site mitigation policy for en-
ergy rights-of-way requires off-site mitigation of environmental
harm only if the applicant volunteers to do so.110  The policy pro-
vides that “[t]he BLM may identify other offsite mitigation op-
portunities to address impacts of the project proposal, but is not
to carry them forward for detailed analysis unless volunteered by
the applicant.”111  The BLM states that it has no intention of cre-
ating a complex, compensatory-mitigation scheme analogous to
that of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ wetlands-mitigation
program when applicants do volunteer off-site mitigation.112
Rather, the BLM would prefer to require only on-site mitigation
for all energy rights-of-way authorizations, including wind en-
ergy.  This position is consistent with an executive order by Presi-
dent Bush, which ordered executive agencies to “expedite
projects that will increase the production, transmission, or con-
servation of energy.”113
107 Id.
108 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 11, at A-4 to R
-5 (citing Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-069 as stating the authoritative policy
on off-site mitigation); see also 1 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3-35 (same). R
109 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-069, supra note
106, at 1. R
110 See id.  at 2.  (“The BLM will approach compensatory mitigation on an ‘as
appropriate’ basis where it can be performed onsite and on a voluntary basis where
it is performed offsite.”).
111 Id.  at 3.
112 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Compensa-
tory Mitigation 3, http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy05/im2005-069attach3.pdf (last
visited Nov. 27, 2006).  For more information on the wetlands mitigation program
administered by the Corps of Engineers, see infra notes 248-50 and accompanying R
text.
113 Exec. Order No. 13,212, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,357 (May 18, 2001).  The Record of
Decision references Executive Order 13,212 as one of the bases for implementation
of the BLM’s wind-energy policies. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECI-
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Despite the BLM’s general rule, the BLM Off-Site Mitigation
Guidance confusingly leaves room for exceptions.  For example,
the document states:
While the voluntary application of offsite mitigation is the
general rule, there are circumstances where negotiation would
be appropriate.  In cases where one or more applicants in a
specific geographic location have volunteered to perform off-
site mitigation, it could be appropriate for other applicants in
the same area to apply the same or similar offsite
mitigation.114
In the event that an applicant does volunteer off-site mitiga-
tion efforts, the BLM would consider the possibility of collecting
fees to contribute to a larger mitigation effort.115  Thus, while
there may be exceptions to the general rule, the BLM seems re-
luctant to require a developer to provide involuntary off-site
mitigation.
The BLM’s voluntary off-site mitigation policy may be inap-
propriate in the wind-energy field.  At least one recent wind-en-
ergy developer has volunteered to pay a percentage of its
revenues toward off-site mitigation.116  It may be appropriate to
SION, supra note 11, at 5.  However, the executive order does not specifically address R
off-site mitigation.
114 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-069, supra note
106, at 5.  The BLM also recognizes that its general policy of voluntary off-site miti- R
gation may be limited by statute. See id.  at 3 (“Offsite mitigation that has resulted
from a formal Section 7 [of the Endangered Species Act] or Section 106 [of the
National Historic Preservation Act] consultation is not affected by this IM.”).
115 The BLM Off-Site Mitigation Guidance lays out fairly detailed guidelines for
how mitigation fees could be used to offset impacts:
In some circumstances, BLM may accept volunteered monies to pay for a
larger effort to mitigate the impact of multiple actions when it is infeasible
to require individual applicants to manage specific mitigation efforts.  Such
monies are to be used for on-the-ground projects.  In order to qualify as
offsite mitigation, the funds collected must be identified for specific types
of mitigation projects and either the BLM or other parties may be identi-
fied as responsible for implementation of the project(s).  However, it is not
BLM policy to waive or forego onsite mitigation of impacts through pay-
ment of monies.
Id.  at 4.  If such fees were required, substantial conservation efforts could be under-
taken to offset the impacts of large scale development programs. See supra  text
accompanying notes 107-11. R
116 See Letter from Roald Doskeland, Pres., Windland, Inc. to Wendy Reynolds,
Field Office Manager, Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Apr. 27, 2005) reprinted in BUREAU
OF LAND MGMT., COTTEREL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra
note 5, at app. F [hereinafter Letter from Roald Dosekland to Wendy Reynolds] R
(volunteering to provide funding for off-site mitigation); see also BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., COTTEREL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at R
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level the playing field by requiring off-site mitigation of all wind-
energy developments on BLM lands.  However, the BLM may be
concerned that by requiring off-site mitigation in the wind-en-
ergy context, it may be forced to also require off-site mitigation
in the oil and gas context, where applicants may be less willing to
provide it.
In the BLM Off-Site Mitigation Guidance and its program-
matic wind-energy policy, the Agency avoids such difficult policy
questions by taking the position that it has very little authority to
require off-site mitigation.117  The BLM provides little explana-
tion for its conclusion because it merely cites one provision of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)118 that
would apply to wind-energy projects.119  However, the voluntary
off-site mitigation policy is consistent with the relatively unre-
strictive on-site BMPs adopted in the Record of Decision, which
do not appear to preclude development of environmentally sensi-
tive sites.120  Both the unrestrictive on-site BMPs and the policy
of not requiring off-site mitigation imply that, as a general policy,
the BLM does not intend to impose onerous environmental regu-
lations, and may fail to adequately protect against environmental
harm.
Ultimately, the BLM’s voluntary off-site mitigation policy and
its on-site BMPs beg the question of whether FLPMA prohibits
the Agency from authorizing a wind-energy development that
2-33 to -36 (discussing the potential use Windland’s voluntary funds). Windland has
volunteered to provide the BLM with one-half of one percent of its gross revenue
from electricity sales to fund monitoring, adaptive management, and perhaps off-site
compensatory mitigation of the projects’ impacts.  Letter from Roald Dosekland to
Wendy Reynolds, supra .  This amount would be in addition to the royalty fees paid
by the applicant.  For a 200-megawatt project, the size of the proposed project, ap-
proximately $150,000 would be donated annually to the off-site mitigation fund. Id.
Allocation of the funds among off-site mitigation activities may be determined by a
technical steering committee. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., COTTEREL DRAFT ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 2-36. R
117 See, e.g. , BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sage-
brush Plant Communities , supra note 62, at 15 (“BLM’s authority to require off-site R
mitigation is limited.”).
118 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782
(2006).
119 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-069, supra  note
106, at 1 (citing section 302(b) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §1732(b), as providing author- R
ity to require mitigation but not citing any legal reasoning for the BLM’s perceived
lack of authority to require off-site mitigation).
120 For an overview of the relatively permissive BMPs, see supra notes 88-90 and R
accompanying text.
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exceeds a certain threshold of environmental harm.  If so, an ap-
plicant whose project exceeds that threshold, even after incorpo-
rating the on-site BMPs adopted by the Record of Decision,
would have two choices.  First, the applicant could “volunteer”
to incorporate off-site mitigation measures to bring the environ-
mental harm below the legal threshold.  Alternatively, the appli-
cant may not volunteer off-site mitigation, in which case the
BLM must reject the project because it exceeds the threshold of
environmental harm.  In such a circumstance the BLM’s volun-
tary off-site mitigation policy is far from voluntary because off-
site mitigation may be necessary for the approval of certain
projects.  Thus, the key to understanding the true requirements
on wind-energy developers seeking to use BLM lands is to deter-
mine if FLPMA prohibits environmental harm beyond a thresh-
old level and, if so, what level of harm is prohibited by that
threshold.
II
REGULATING WIND-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FEDERAL LAND
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT
A. Federal Land Policy and Management Act Provisions
Requiring Regulation of Wind-Energy Development
FLPMA was passed to prevent the destruction of public
lands.121  Two provisions of FLPMA could substantially affect
the regulation of wind-energy developments to protect natural
resources.  The first provides that the “Secretary shall, by regula-
tion or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unneces-
sary or undue degradation of the lands.”122  The second
requirement is that each grant of a right-of-way over public lands
“shall contain . . . terms and conditions which will . . . minimize
damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat
and otherwise protect the environment.”123  These provisions
could impose a threshold level of environmental harm beyond
which the BLM must either deny a proposal or condition ap-
121 See Roger Flynn, Daybreak on the Land: The Coming of Age of the Federal
Land Policy Management Act of 1976 , 29 VT. L. REV. 815, 816-19 (2005) (providing
a brief overview of the impetus behind, and legislative history and purpose of,
FLPMA).
122 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
123 Id. § 1765(a)(ii).
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proval of the proposal on mitigation measures that effectively
lower the level of harm below the threshold.124  When on-site
mitigation measures cannot adequately decrease harm to an ac-
ceptable level, these FLPMA provisions may require approval of
a project to be conditioned on off-site mitigation.
1. The Unnecessary or Undue Degradation Standard
FLPMA requires the BLM to “take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation” to federal lands
(UUD standard).125  Unlike the requirements of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA),126 this requirement applies to all projects
that may degrade public lands, not just those that may affect en-
dangered species.127  Additionally, unlike the requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),128 which merely
requires a candid analysis of the environmental impacts of a pro-
posed project,129 the UUD standard actually requires prevention
of the degradation.  Thus, the UUD standard has the potential to
either prevent a substantial number of development proposals or
require approval to be conditioned on significant mitigation
measures.
124 The BLM’s Off-Site Mitigation Guidance also cites a provision of the Mineral
Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226(g), as a potential grant of authority to condition ap-
proval of energy rights-of-way on mitigation plans.  Instruction Memorandum No.
2005-069, supra note 106, at 1.  However, that provision is inapplicable to wind- R
energy developments because the Mineral Leasing Act only pertains to leases of
federal lands for the production of oil and gas deposits.  30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (2006).
Consequently, analysis of the Mineral Leasing Act, which may authorize or require
mitigation measures in other energy right-of-way authorizations, is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
125 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
126 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
127 Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (applying the UUD standard to all actions the
Secretary takes “[i]n managing the public lands”), and  16 U.S.C. § 1533 (providing
for the designation of a species as “threatened” or “endangered”), and  16 U.S.C.
§ 1536 (requiring consultation between government agencies to prevent habitat deg-
radation only if a listed species may be affected), and  16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (ex-
tending the ESA’s prohibition of takings only to listed species), and  16 U.S.C.
§ 1538 (prohibiting the import, export, or maritime capture of, and foreign or inter-
state commerce in, listed species).
128 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
129 See, e.g., Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
228 (1980) (“In the present litigation there is no doubt that [the Department of
Housing and Urban Development] considered the environmental consequences of
its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing. NEPA requires
no more.”).
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However, the vague UUD standard itself, undefined in
FLPMA, hardly indicates how much degradation is “undue” or
“unnecessary.”130  While FLPMA’s legislative history generally
indicates that Congress intended to protect the public lands from
degradation,131 there is no clarification of the UUD standard it-
self.  The term “unnecessary” implies a restriction on activities
that are not necessary to carry forth the particular activity at is-
sue.132  For example, it is necessary to build a road to an oil rig if
that is the only way to use and maintain the oil rig.  However, the
term “undue” implies a restriction on any activity that would
cause a certain level of undue impact, regardless of how neces-
sary it may be to conduct the activity at issue.133  To prevent un-
due degradation, the BLM may have to deny or condition
approval of the proposal to build the road to the oil rig even if
any similarly situated oil developer would consider the road a
necessary element of the development.  Thus, the term “unneces-
sary” focuses on the activity being regulated and mandates that
the BLM impose an industry standard of damage for each given
activity conducted on public land.  Once the industry standard of
damage is exceeded, the BLM must reject or condition the pro-
posal because of its unnecessary damage.134  In sharp contrast,
the term “undue” focuses objectively on the environment.
130 See Roger Flynn & Jeffrey Parsons, The Right to Say No: Federal Authority
over Hardrock Mining on Public Lands , 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 249, 281 (2001)
(“The BLM’s duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation under FLPMA
§ 302 has not received close scrutiny or much clarification by the courts and has
rarely been litigated.”).
131 See id. at 282 (quoting 122 Cong. Rec. S1232 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1975) (state-
ment of Sen. Haskell), reprinted in S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 54 (1978)); S. REP. NO. 94-583, at 35 (1975), re-
printed in S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 100
(1978).
132 See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1005 n.13 (D. Utah 1979) (noting that a
“reasonable interpretation of the word ‘unnecessary’ is that which is not necessary
for mining”).
133 See Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 285 (discussing the implications of the R
terms “unnecessary” and “undue”); see also Utah , 486 F. Supp. at 1005 n.13 (ex-
plaining that “undue” means “that which is excessive, improper, immoderate or
unwarranted”).
134 See  Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 284-85 (discussing the regulatory im- R
plications of FLPMA’s language); see also  Michael Graf, Application of Takings
Law to the Regulation of Unpatented Mining Claims , 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57, 107-08
(1997) (noting that even normal mining operations may cause undue degradation,
triggering stricter regulation).
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Therefore, the BLM must either reject or impose conditions on
any proposed use of public land that exceeds a level of damage
that is “undue.”135  FLPMA provides no further indication of
what level of environmental damage exceeds the threshold level
of undue damage.
Also significant, the UUD standard uses the disjunctive word
“or” to require prevention of degradation that is either unneces-
sary or  undue.136  Since the disjunctive “or” separates these two
terms, a logical reading indicates that the BLM must prevent
degradation that is either unnecessary or undue, requiring it to
look objectively at environmental impacts for each proposed de-
velopment.137  FLPMA’s legislative history confirms the proposi-
tion that the term “or” requires prevention of degradation that is
either unnecessary for the activity proposed or that causes an ob-
jectively undue level of degradation to public resources.138  Since
prevention of unnecessary degradation merely imposes an indus-
try standard upon developers, the requirement to prevent objec-
tively undue degradation imposes a more restrictive limitation on
uses of public land.  The use of “or” increases the level of envi-
ronmental protection provided by the UUD standard because it
establishes the possibility of rejecting proposed uses, even if all
economically feasible measures and industry standards are
incorporated.
With the vague term “undue” being critical to understanding
the requirements of the UUD standard, further regulatory clarifi-
cation is crucial.  However, the BLM’s understanding of the
UUD standard has been a moving target in recent years.  The
135 See  Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 285 (discussing 1999 Department of R
the Interior Solicitor memorandum that argues that Congress has authorized the
BLM to prevent both unnecessary and undue degradation). Cf. id.  at 264 (quoting
Clouser v. Madigan, 1992 WL 694368, at *4 (D. Or. 1992), aff’d sub nom . Clouser v.
Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Forest Service’s organic stat-
ute obligates the agency to ensure that approval of projects and plans does not effect
the destruction and degradation of public forests)).
136 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
137 See Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 285 (concluding that this is likely the R
accurate interpretation of the statute and citing a memorandum from the Interior
Department Solicitor concurring with this reading).
138 Id. at 284-85.  A bill introduced in the 105th Congress and backed by mining
interests would have changed the disjunctive term “or” to the term “and” in order to
eliminate the requirement to prevent “undue” degradation. Id.  The fact that the
mining industry attempted to remove the term “or” strongly supports the interpreta-
tion that the term “or” makes the standard more restrictive of mining activities, and
hence more protective of the environment. Id.
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BLM clarified the requirement that it prevent “unnecessary or
undue degradation” in regulations for hard-rock mining139 and
for authorizing rights-of-way across public lands for a multitude
of uses.140  These regulatory definitions have changed dramati-
cally since FLPMA’s enactment, further clouding the require-
ments of the UUD standard.
a. The Old Regulatory Definitions
In 1980, the BLM promulgated regulations for hard-rock min-
ing, which clarified the UUD standard.141  In 1989, the BLM
promulgated regulations that clarified the UUD standard for au-
thorizing right-of-way permits over BLM lands.142  Both of these
regulatory definitions allowed the BLM to authorize proposals
on BLM lands regardless of the objective environmental impact
to that land, effectively eliminating the statutory requirement to
prevent undue degradation.143
(i) The UUD Standard in Hard-Rock Mining Regulations
The hard-rock mining regulations set up a framework for ap-
proving a plan of operations for mining proposals on more than
five acres of land,144 which included application of the UUD
standard to those mining proposals.145  However, the 1980 regu-
lations took a limited view of what FLPMA’s UUD standard
required:
Unnecessary or undue degradation means surface disturbance
greater than what would normally result when an activity is be-
ing accomplished by a prudent operator in usual, customary,
and proficient operations of similar character  and taking into
consideration the effects of operations on other resources and
land uses, including those resources and uses outside the area
139 Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,001
(Nov. 21, 2000).
140 Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the
Mineral Leasing Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,970, 20,979 (Apr. 22, 2005).
141 See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1980) (unnecessary or undue degradation).  The
same definition was being used in 2000. See, e.g. , 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (2000).
142 Amendment to Provide Procedures for Action on Unauthorized Use, Occu-
pancy, or Development of Public Lands for Transportation, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,854
(June 20, 1989).
143 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
144 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1-4 (1981).
145 Id. § 3809.0-1; see also  Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 258 (explaining R
that the regulations implement the UUD standard through approval or denial of a
plan of operations submitted by parties interested in mining).
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of operations.  Failure to initiate and complete reasonable mit-
igation measures, including reclamation of disturbed areas or
creation of a nuisance may constitute unnecessary or undue
degradation.  Failure to comply with applicable environmental
protection statutes and regulations thereunder will constitute
unnecessary or undue degradation.146
This definition of the UUD standard focused almost exclu-
sively on what activities are necessary to mine, not on the impact
of mining on the environment.  Instead of relying on the impact
of the mining project to environmental and resource values, the
1980 regulations merely required miners to act as a “prudent op-
erator” would and comply with other environmental laws.147
Consequently, the regulation is commonly said to have estab-
lished the “prudent operator standard.”148  This regulatory defi-
nition completely ignored the requirement for prevention of
undue degradation.  Essentially, the 1980 hard-rock mining defi-
nition of the UUD standard made it difficult to deny a mining
proposal or even restrict its impacts to public lands beyond the
industry standard for environmental protection.
In 2000, the Clinton administration’s Department of the Inte-
rior, led by Bruce Babbitt, attempted to account for objective
environmental harm in the UUD standard.  This sudden change
in policy was a result of the Interior Department’s recognition
that the UUD standard may require the BLM to consider both
undue and unnecessary degradation.149  As a result, the defini-
tion of the UUD standard in the hard-rock mining regulations
146 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1981) (emphasis added).  This definition of “unneces-
sary and undue degradation” was initially promulgated in 1980. See  Surface Man-
agement of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,910
(Nov. 26, 1980) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800) (defining “unnecessary or un-
due degradation”).  The term “unnecessary or undue degradation” was also defined
in the hard-rock mining regulations governing mining in wilderness areas on March
3, 1980. See  Wilderness Review Program, 45 Fed. Reg. 13,968 (Mar. 3, 1980)
(promulgating regulations to prevent “unnecessary or undue degradation”).  That
definition contained a similar focus on preventing mining activities only if they
would not “normally be expected.” Id.  at 13,975.
147 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1981).
148 See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2003)
(discussing the BLM’s historical rulemaking with regard to the UUD standard).
149 See  Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 285 (citing Memorandum from John R
Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to Acting Director, Bureau of Land
Mgmt. (Dec. 27, 1999) (recognizing that the BLM may be “obliged” to ensure pre-
vention of undue degradation in addition to focusing on customary industry
practices)).
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was amended in 2000.150  Unlike the 1980 regulations, the 2000
regulations did not ignore undue degradation caused by mining
activities.  Instead the 2000 regulations established the UUD
standard as preventing “conditions, activities, or practices that
. . . result in substantial irreparable harm to significant scientific,
cultural, or environmental resource values of the public lands
that cannot be effectively mitigated.”151  Presumably, this re-
quired the BLM to deny uses altogether if they would cause
“substantial irreparable harm” that could not be mitigated.
This UUD standard, commonly referred to as the “substantial
irreparable harm” standard,152 clearly sought to prevent undue
degradation, even if such degradation was necessary in order to
mine.153  The BLM justified defining the UUD standard as such
by indicating that the 2000 definition was more consistent with
the statutory language.154  Also significant, the 2000 regulation
envisioned requiring undue impacts be “mitigated” in order to
comply with the UUD standard.155  The definition of “mitiga-
tion” mirrored the definition in regulations promulgated by the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for NEPA,156 and in-
cluded “[c]ompensating for the impact by replacing, or providing
substitute, resources or environments.”157  However, while ac-
knowledging that off-site mitigation is “clearly an available form
of mitigation,” the BLM only planned on requiring compensa-
150 Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998 (Nov. 21, 2000).
151 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2001).
152 See Mineral Policy Ctr. , 292 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (noting this connotation of the
2000 UUD standard).
153 However, the substantial-irreparable-harm standard was somewhat constricted
in the rule’s explanation, which indicated the UUD standard would only provide for
denial of a plan of operations “in exceptional circumstances.” See  Flynn & Parsons,
supra note 130, at 287 (quoting Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 70,048).  This R
may be an over-qualification of the UUD standard since FLPMA does not mention
limiting the application of the UUD standard to exceptional circumstances. Id.
154 The explanation of the 2000 regulation states: “Clarifying that the definition
specifically addresses situations of ‘undue’ as well as ‘unnecessary’ degradation will
more completely and faithfully implement the statutory standard, by protecting sig-
nificant resource values of the public lands without presuming that impacts neces-
sary to mining must be allowed to occur.”  Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
70,001.
155 The BLM stated, “Mitigation measures fall squarely within the actions the Sec-
retary can direct to prevent undue or unnecessary degradation of the public lands.
An impact that can be mitigated, but is not, is unnecessary.” Id.  at 70,012; see also
id.  at 70,114 (describing mitigation options).
156 Id.  at 70,012; see also  40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2006) (providing the CEQ defini-
tion of mitigation).
157 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 70,114.
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tory mitigation if it could be conducted on-site.158  Off-site miti-
gation would be incorporated into a plan of operations only if
volunteered by the miner.159  Despite the fact that the CEQ reg-
ulations make no distinctions between on-site and off-site mitiga-
tion measures,160 the BLM made no effort to explain its
reasoning for making off-site mitigation voluntary.161  Thus, the
2000 regulations envisioned that the BLM may use off-site miti-
gation to bring a proposed plan of operations into compliance
with the UUD standard.162
The substantial-irreparable-harm standard in the 2000 regula-
tions was short-lived.  After several lawsuits challenged its valid-
ity, the new Bush administration stayed enforcement of the
regulations and began promulgating their replacement.163  In
2001, the BLM promulgated a new UUD standard perhaps even
less stringent than the prudent-operator standard:
Unnecessary or undue degradation means conditions, activi-
ties, or practices that:
(1) Fail to comply with one or more of the following: the
performance standards in [43 C.F.R.] § 3809.420, the terms
and conditions of an approved plan of operations, operations
described in a complete notice, and other Federal and state
laws related to environmental protection and protection of
cultural resources;
(2) Are not “reasonably incident”  to prospecting, mining, or
processing operations as defined in [43 C.F.R.] § 3715.0-5 . . .
or
158 Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 70,012.
159 Id.
160 See  40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (making no distinction between on-site and off-site
mitigation).
161 See  Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 70,012 (providing no explanation for
the decision to adopt mandatory on-site mitigation and voluntary off-site mitiga-
tion).  Several comments on the proposed rule argued that the UUD standard does
not authorize the BLM to impose compensatory, off-site mitigation requirements.
Id.  The preamble certainly implied that this reading of the UUD standard was in-
correct by indicating that mitigation could include off-site mitigation measures. Id.
Additionally, in certain circumstances where on-site mitigation measures do not ad-
equately mitigate the “substantial irreparable harm,” a miner may have to “volun-
teer” off-site mitigation to get a plan of operations approved.  As such, the off-site
mitigation is hardly voluntary.
162 It is probably debatable whether off-site mitigation can legally bring a plan of
operations for a large, open-pit mine into compliance with the UUD standard. See
Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 286 (arguing that “off-site mitigation contra- R
dicts and undermines FLPMA’s requirement to prevent unnecessary and undue
degradation”).
163 Id. at 279-80.
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(3) Fail to attain a stated level of protection or reclamation
required by specific laws in areas such as the California Desert
Conservation Area, Wild and Scenic Rivers, BLM-adminis-
tered portions of the National Wilderness System, and BLM-
administered National Monuments and National Conservation
Areas.164
In turn, the performance standards in 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420
provided uniform methods to limit the impact of mining activities
and reclaim the site, and other requirements that the BLM may
impose on individual projects, including mitigation.165  The defi-
nition of mitigation remained the same as in the CEQ regulations
and the prior subpart 3809 regulations.166
This new definition of the UUD standard was an abrupt depar-
ture from the BLM’s strict substantial-irreparable-harm standard
and was the result of the Bush administration’s fundamentally
different view of the UUD standard.  The final rule was accom-
panied by a memorandum by Solicitor William G. Meyers III to
Secretary of the Interior Gail Norton.  In Solicitor Meyers’ opin-
ion, the UUD standard did not allow the BLM to prevent undue
degradation when such degradation was necessary to mine.167  In
addition to reliance upon Solicitor Meyers’ legal interpretations,
the BLM later reasoned in court that the substantial-irreparable-
harm standard had to be replaced because it would decrease min-
ing operations on public lands by ten percent to thirty percent.168
Ultimately, the BLM decided “implementation and enforcement
[of the substantial-irreparable-harm standard] would be difficult
and potentially subjective, as well as expensive for both BLM
and the industry.”169  The BLM thought that the resources pro-
tected by the substantial irreparable-harm standard could be pro-
tected by “other means.”170  Thus, in promulgating the 2001
164 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2002) (second emphasis added); see also Surface Manage-
ment, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834, 54,837-38 (Oct. 30, 2001) (stating justifications for replac-
ing the prudent-operator standard).
165 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(4) (2002).
166 Compare  40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2001) (defining mitigation), and  43 C.F.R.
§ 3809.5 (2001) (same), and  Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 70,114 (2000
regulations).
167 Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 327-28. R
168 See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing
Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,107 (Nov. 21, 2000)) (stating that the
BLM justified abandoning the substantial-irreparable-harm standard after determin-
ing that the 2000 rule would decrease mining by ten percent to thirty percent).
169 Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834, 54,846 (Oct. 30, 2001).
170 Id.  at 54,838.
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UUD standard, the BLM assumed the 1980 regulation had been
a legal interpretation of FLPMA and that the substantial-irrepa-
rable-harm standard had been an illegal interpretation of the
BLM’s authority under FLPMA.171  However, even the Bush ad-
ministration’s BLM agreed that off-site, compensatory mitigation
could be used to comply with the UUD standard.
Others argued that the 2001 UUD standard violated FLPMA
by failing to prevent undue degradation and by assuming that
there was a right to mine regardless of the environmental
harm.172  In this view, the 2001 UUD standard was simply a rein-
carnation of the prudent-operator standard from 1980 with some-
what more artful terminology.  These disagreements over the
meaning of the UUD standard were ultimately resolved in
court.173
(ii) The UUD Standard in Right-of-Way Regulations
The BLM has also interpreted the UUD standard in its regula-
tions governing rights-of-way over BLM lands.174  In regulations
prior to 2005, the right-of-way regulations prohibited “[a]ny use,
occupancy, or development of the public lands that requires a
right-of-way . . . and . . . that causes unnecessary or undue degra-
dation. . . .”175  Thus, while use or creation of a right-of-way in
and of itself may have very minor impacts, the BLM could have
used its authority to grant or deny rights-of-way to essentially
grant or deny entire projects.  The impact of the entire project is
determinative, not the impact of the right-of-way alone.  There-
fore, the right-of-way regulations have the potential to restrict
not only mining but any activity that uses a right-of-way over
public lands.
171 The preamble to 2001 UUD standard declined to comment on whether the
substantial-irreparable-harm standard was “legally promulgated.” Id.  However, the
BLM concurrently represented its belief that the substantial-irreparable-harm stan-
dard exceeded the discretion in 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).  The final rule was accompa-
nied by a memo from Solicitor Norman G. Meyers III that indicated the substantial-
irreparable-harm standard was ultra vires  to the extent that it would preclude activi-
ties necessary to conduct a mining operation. See supra  note 167. R
172 See, e.g., Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, at 327-29 (critiquing the UUD stan- R
dard in the 2001 regulations).
173 See infra  text accompanying notes 200-11.
174 43 C.F.R. § 2800.0-5(x) (2004).
175 Id. § 2801.3(a).  These right-of-way regulations authorized the BLM to penal-
ize right-of-way permit holders who violated the UUD standard. Id. § 2801.3(a)-(b).
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The right-of-way regulations have essentially mirrored the ini-
tial interpretation of the UUD standard in hard-rock mining.
Like the 1980 prudent-operator standard, the old right-of-way
regulations defined “unnecessary or undue degradation” in a way
that read “undue degradation” out of the UUD standard:
[S]urface disturbance greater than that which would normally
result when the same or a similar activity is being accom-
plished by a prudent person in a usual, customary, and profi-
cient manner that takes into consideration the effects of the
activity on other resources and land uses, including those re-
sources and uses outside the area of activity.176
This interpretation of the UUD standard, in relevant part, al-
most mirrors the 1980 prudent-operator standard in the hard-
rock mining regulations.177  Indeed, the only difference appears
to be that the 1989 right-of-way UUD standard is the prudent-
person standard, rather than the prudent-operator standard
found in the 1980 hard-rock mining regulations.178  While the
prudent-person standard was not included in the initial promul-
gation of the right-of-way regulations in 1980, it was added in
1989, and mirrored the prudent-operator standard that already
existed in the 1980 hard-rock mining regulations.179
However, unlike the 1980 hard-rock mining regulations’ pru-
dent-operator standard, the Clinton administration did not alter
the prudent-person standard for granting rights-of-way.180  Since
both standards are ultimately derived from the same statutory
UUD standard, it seems contradictory to amend one but not the
other.  Regardless, the legal challenge to the Bush administra-
176 Id. § 2800.0-5(x) (emphasis added).
177 Compare id.  (right-of-way regulations), and 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (2000)
(hard-rock mining regulations).
178 Compare 43 C.F.R. § 2800.0-5(x) (2004) (using phrase “prudent person”), and
43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (2000) (using phrase “prudent operator”).
179 The phrase “unnecessary or undue degradation” was first defined in the right-
of-way regulations promulgated on June 20, 1989.  Amendment to Provide Proce-
dures for Action on Unauthorized Use, Occupancy, or Development of Public
Lands for Transportation and Other Purposes, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,851, 25,854 (June 20,
1989).  The right-of-way regulations were initially promulgated on July 1, 1980, but
neither included the term “unnecessary or undue degradation” nor its definition.
See generally  Management of Rights-of-Way and Related Facilities on Public Lands
and Reimbursement of Costs, 45 Fed. Reg. 44,526 (July 1, 1980).
180 Compare 43 C.F.R. § 2800.0-5(x) (2000) (Clinton administration right-of-way
UUD standard), and 43 C.F.R. § 2800.05(x) (1992) (pre-Clinton administration
right-of-way UUD standard).  In contrast, the Clinton administration redefined the
UUD standard in the hard rock mining regulations. See supra  text accompanying
notes 149-62. R
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tion’s 2001 UUD standard in the hard-rock mining context would
ultimately provide some insight into what is legally required in
both the mining and right-of-way contexts because both inter-
preted the same statutory language.
b. Administrative Appeals Decisions
Administrative adjudications by the Department of the Inte-
rior’s Board of Land Appeals also demonstrate the schizophrenic
nature of the BLM’s reading of the UUD standard.  Some opin-
ions state that the UUD standard gives the BLM broad authority
to impose conditions on proposed projects, and some opinions
imply that the BLM is required to do so.181  However, other
opinions take the same constricted view of the BLM’s authority
as that of the prudent-operator and prudent-person standards
discussed above.182  Despite these inconsistencies, the Interior
Board of Land Appeals has regularly upheld conditions imposed
by the BLM that attempt to prevent degradation that would not
typically occur in the particular industry.183  This reading at least
creates an industry standard of impermissible degradation that
the BLM can enforce.
c. Judicial Opinions and the Illegality of the Old Definitions
Until recently, judicial interpretations of the UUD standard
have shed little light on the breadth of the authority and require-
181 See Flynn & Parsons, supra note 130, 258 n.38 (citing Kendall’s Concerned R
Area Residents, 129 I.B.L.A. 130, 138-40 (1994) (“If unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion cannot be prevented by mitigating measures [for a mining project], BLM is
required to deny approval of the plan.”) and Draco Mines, Inc., 75 I.B.L.A. 278, 287
(1983) (holding that the BLM may properly condition approval of a mining opera-
tions plan on acceptance of stipulations designed to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation with on-site mitigation). See also Red Thunder, Inc., 101 Interior Dec.
52, 63 (1994) (“If the nature or degree of the degradation were such that the only
effective way to prevent it were a complete cessation of mining operations, then
under section 302(b) the State Director would be authorized and obligated to order
a complete cessation.”).
182 See, e.g., Colo. Envt’l Coal., 165 I.B.L.A. 221, 229 (2005) (“[T]o show that an
action results in undue or unnecessary degradation of leasehold lands, at a mini-
mum, [the BLM] would have to show that a lessee’s operations are or were con-
ducted in a manner that does not comply with applicable law or regulations, prudent
management and practice, or reasonably available technology, such that the lessee
could not undertake that action pursuant to a valid existing right.”).
183 See, e.g., Comm. for Idaho’s High Desert, 146 I.B.L.A. 194, 202 (1998) (“This
standard requires BLM to consider the extent of surface disturbance and the effects
on resources and land uses both within and outside the area of operations in com-
parison to similar operations.”).
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ments it creates.  In Sierra Club v. Hodel ,184 the Tenth Circuit
established that the UUD standard is judicially enforceable and
requires the BLM to limit degradation.185  In Hodel , the plain-
tiffs argued that a proposal to improve a road that crossed a ripa-
rian area on public lands, and would degrade an adjacent
wilderness-study area, violated the UUD standard.186  Arguing
that the UUD standard “breathes discretion at every pore,” the
BLM asserted that the UUD standard was not judicially enforce-
able.187  The Tenth Circuit rejected the BLM’s argument, holding
that the UUD standard imposes a requirement on the BLM that
can be judicially reviewed.188  The BLM also argued that it could
not prevent use of the road because the right-of-way permit pre-
dated FLPMA and the UUD standard.189  While the Tenth Cir-
cuit agreed that the UUD standard could not prevent use of the
right-of-way altogether,190 the court indicated the UUD standard
still required the BLM to locate the road where it would “make
the least degrading impact on the [wilderness study area].”191
Without a valid right-of-way permit predating FLPMA, the Ho-
del court likely would have held that right-of-way access could be
prevented altogether if it violated the UUD standard.192
The Ninth Circuit has also examined the UUD standard.  In
Sierra Club v. Clark ,193 the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the UUD standard required the government to
reject a proposal for a motorcycle race in a wilderness-study
area.194  However, the case provides very little information on
the amount of degradation the race would cause.195  In Sierra
184 Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
185 Id.  at 1096 (holding that the BLM has a duty to prevent unnecessary
degradation).
186 Id.  at 1073-74.
187 Id.  at 1074.
188 Id. at 1076.
189 Id.  at 1088.
190 Id.  (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1769 (1982)).  Section 509 of FLPMA precludes the
BLM from using the requirements in FLPMA to “terminate[ ]” any right-of-way
that pre-dates FLPMA, but does not preclude the BLM from modifying valid ex-
isting rights to comply with FLPMA.  43 U.S.C. § 1769(a).
191 Hodel , 848 F.2d at 1088.
192 See id.  at 1088 (relying entirely on 43 U.S.C. § 1769).
193 Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985).
194 Id.  at 1410.
195 Id.
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Club v. Penfold ,196 the plaintiffs challenged the BLM’s categori-
cal exemption of all mines less than five acres from any NEPA or
environmental review process.197  The district court’s opinion in-
dicated that the UUD standard required balancing the environ-
mental harms against the social and economic benefits of
mining.198  However, when the Ninth Circuit reviewed Penfold , it
did not specifically address the district court’s analysis of the
UUD standard.199  The balancing test has not been applied by
any courts subsequently.
After decades without a well-settled judicial determination of
the requirements of the UUD standard, a 2003 court decision
provided some clarification.  In Mineral Policy Center v. Norton ,
several provisions of the 2001 hard-rock mining regulations, in-
cluding the UUD standard, were challenged by environmental
groups.200  In protection of its interests, a mining-industry group
intervened to advocate for even less-stringent regulations.201  The
BLM and the mining group defended the regulations by relying
upon Solicitor Meyers’ opinion, which concluded that the BLM
had no authority to prevent undue degradation if such degrada-
tion was necessary to mine.202  However, the court sided with the
plaintiffs’ argument that the UUD standard requires the BLM to
prevent both undue and unnecessary degradation:
The court finds that the Solicitor misconstrued the clear man-
date of FLPMA.  FLPMA, by its plain terms, vests the Secre-
tary of the Interior with the authority—and indeed the
obligation—to disapprove of an otherwise permissible mining
operation because the operation, though necessary for mining,
would unduly harm or degrade the public land.203
For the first time since FLPMA’s enactment, a court held that
the UUD standard requires the BLM to reject a proposed use of
public lands that will exceed a certain threshold of environmental
harm.  This holding implicitly endorsed the substantial-irrepara-
ble-harm standard.
196 Sierra Club v. Penfold, [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,463 (Envtl. Law Inst.) (D.
Alaska Nov. 6, 1987).
197 Id.  at 20,464.
198 Id.  at 20,468.
199 See generally  Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988).
200 Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2003).
201 Id.  at 32 n.3, 35 n.9.
202 Id.  at 41-42; see also supra text accompanying notes 167-72. R
203 Mineral Policy Ctr. , 292 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
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However, the court stopped short of holding facially invalid
the definition of the UUD standard in the 2001 mining regula-
tions.  Rather, calling it an “extremely close” question,204 the
court held that the 2001 regulations were a permissible interpre-
tation of the UUD standard.205  Acknowledging that the 2001
mining regulation’s reliance upon Solicitor Meyers’ opinion un-
dermined the claim that the regulation could prevent “undue
degradation,” the court reasoned that the regulation “was not
based primarily upon” Solicitor Meyers’ opinion.206  The court
accepted the BLM’s argument that it could still reject individual
mining operation proposals that would cause “undue degrada-
tion” under the 2001 regulations “by exercising case-by-case dis-
cretion to protect the environment.”207  The 2001 UUD standard
was, therefore, only permissible because it did not completely
foreclose the BLM’s authority to prevent proposals that would
cause objectively undue degradation to public land.208
In sum, Mineral Policy Center  essentially held that the BLM
must reject proposals that cause undue degradation, regardless of
the necessity of the proposed activity for mining.  This require-
ment comes from FLPMA itself and cannot be altered by regula-
tions, even those accompanied by a legal opinion of the Solicitor
of the Department of the Interior.  However, even Mineral Pol-
icy Center  did not delve into how much degradation of public
lands is “undue” since the case involved a facial challenge of the
regulations.  The case sent a clear message to the BLM that the
UUD standard requires it to deny proposals that will cause un-
204 Id.  at 45 n.18.
205 Id.  at 45-46.
206 Id.  at 46 n.18.
207 Id.  at 44.
208 The holding is succinctly summarized as follows:
The court thus finds that, in promulgating FLPMA, Congress tasked the
Secretary of Interior with preventing both “unnecessary” as well as “un-
due” degradation to the public lands.  The court finds further, however,
that the terms “unnecessary” and “undue,” which are not defined in the
FLPMA, are themselves ambiguous. . . .  In tasking the Secretary to pre-
vent “unnecessary or undue” degradation, Congress left two broad gaps for
the Secretary to fill, which the Secretary has elected to fill through the
exercise of her discretion, on a case-by-case basis. . . .  Plaintiffs have
neither demonstrated that the 2001 Regulations fail to prevent unnecessary
or undue degradation of the public lands, in contravention of FLPMA, nor
that Interior, in promulgating the 2001 Regulations, toiled under an erro-
neous view of its own authority.
Id.  at 44-45 (citations omitted).
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due degradation, and that even the right to mine on public lands
is not absolute.  Therefore, the holding left open the possibility
for those opposed to a particular mining proposal or other use of
public lands to prevent it by proving its impacts would cause un-
due degradation.  Additionally, Mineral Policy Center  rejected
the 2001 mining regulations’ failure to apply FLPMA’s “fair mar-
ket value” provision,209 giving the BLM the opportunity to ap-
peal the case to the D.C. Circuit.
d. The BLM’s Response to Mineral Policy Center
(i) Hard-Rock Mining Regulations
In response, the BLM declined to appeal the Mineral Policy
Center ruling and announced in an Instruction Memorandum, IM
2004-133, that it would alter its hard-rock mining policies accord-
ing to the holding.210  While the definition of the UUD standard
can remain unchanged, theoretically the BLM will need to set up
a framework for determining when a mining project will cause
undue degradation if it wishes to abide by Mineral Policy Center .
Regardless of whether the BLM actually changes its mining poli-
cies to better comply with Mineral Policy Center ’s reading of
“unnecessary or undue degradation,”211 the failure to appeal the
decision indicates its significance.212  As the Mineral Policy
Center court implied, the 2001 mining regulation was probably
the outer bounds of the Agency’s discretion to narrowly construe
209 Id.  at 49-50 (relying on 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2000)).
210 See FLYNN, supra note 121, 841 n.149 (quoting Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. R
Dep’t of the Interior, Instruction Memorandum No. 2004-133, Mineral Policy Ctr. v.
Norton-Implementation Guidance 1, 3 (2004)).
211 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
212 Of course, a cynical observer could construe the BLM’s failure to appeal Min-
eral Policy Center as having no significance to the UUD standard, but rather indi-
cates the possibility that the agency might ignore the opinion in other parts of the
country.  The BLM could have appealed the Mineral Policy Center court’s holding
that the regulation failed to implement FLPMA’s “fair market value” requirement.
See  292 F. Supp. 2d at 49-50 (discussing FLPMA’s fair market-value claim provi-
sion).  Had BLM appealed that issue, the plaintiffs likely would have appealed the
UUD standard ruling.  As such, the BLM could have effectively appealed the hold-
ing that “the Solicitor misconstrued the clear mandate of FLPMA” because the
UUD standard requires disapproval of a mining operation that, “though necessary
for mining, would unduly harm or degrade the public land.” Id.  at 42.  The BLM
may have declined to appeal for fear that the D.C. Circuit would adopt the Mineral
Policy Center court’s rejection of Solicitor Meyers’ interpretation, which would ar-
guably be harder for the BLM to ignore than a district court opinion.  Thus, the
failure to appeal may suggest that the BLM hopes to continue to ignore FLPMA’s
requirement to prevent “undue degradation.”
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the statutory phrase “unnecessary or undue degradation.”213
Mineral Policy Center  remains the only federal court ruling to
fully analyze the statutory meaning of the UUD standard, and it
concluded that projects must be rejected if they will cause undue
degradation to the environment.214
(ii) Right-of-Way Regulations
In addition to announcing a change in mining policy, the BLM
has amended its use of the UUD standard in its right-of-way reg-
ulations in the wake of Mineral Policy Center .  As noted above,
beginning in 1989, the right-of-way regulations contained the
prudent-person standard, which in all relevant respects was iden-
tical to the prudent-operator standard in the 1980 hard-rock min-
ing regulations.215  However, in 2005, the BLM abandoned this
approach to the UUD standard when it amended its right-of-way
regulations to update cost-recovery provisions of the right-of-way
program.216  While the regulatory amendments mostly addressed
cost-recovery concerns, they also drastically changed the imple-
mentation of the prior UUD standard, effectively eliminating the
prudent-person standard.217
In abandoning the prudent-person standard, the 2005 right-of-
way regulations seem to address the UUD standard entirely on a
case-by-case basis.  The 2005 right-of-way regulations eliminated
the prior definition of “unnecessary or undue degradation,” and
did not replace it with another definition.218  However, the unde-
fined UUD standard does appear in one section of the 2005 regu-
lations.219  In that section, the UUD standard is included among
the terms the BLM will impose on all rights-of-way:
213 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). See Mineral Policy Ctr. , 292 F. Supp. 2d at 46 n.18 (call-
ing the legality of BLM’s interpretation an “extremely close case”).
214 Mineral Policy Ctr. , 292 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
215 See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. R
216 Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the
Mineral Leasing Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,970 (Apr. 22, 2005).  This release of the rule
lists several reasons for updating the right-of-way regulations. Id.  at 20,970-79.
Each of the listed reasons addresses the need to update the cost-recovery provisions
of the right-of-way regulations. Id.
217 See id.  at 20,979 (acknowledging that the right-of-way regulations’ use of the
term “unnecessary or undue degradation” was altered).
218 Compare 43 C.F.R. § 2801.5 (2005) (containing no definition of “unnecessary
or undue degradation” among the terms listed), with 43 C.F.R. § 2800.0-5(x) (2004)
(prior definition that did not restrict activities that would be undertaken by a “pru-
dent person”).
219 43 C.F.R. § 2805.11 (2006).
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BLM will limit the grant to those lands which BLM
determines:
(1) You will occupy with authorized facilities;
(2) Are necessary for constructing, operating, maintaining,
and terminating the authorized facilities;
(3) Are necessary to protect the public health and safety;
(4) Will not unnecessarily damage the environment; and
(5) Will not result in unnecessary or undue degradation.220
While 43 C.F.R. § 2805.11(a)(4) seems to focus solely on the
restriction of unnecessary degradation, 43 C.F.R. § 2805.11(a)(5)
simply places the statutory term in the regulations, which would
prevent undue degradation if Mineral Policy Center  remains
good law.  Thus, this regulation appears to be promulgated in a
way that is consistent with Solicitor Meyers’ opinion, while at the
same time not being inconsistent with Mineral Policy Center .  In
other words, if the courts ever adopt the legal reasoning of Solici-
tor Meyers’ opinion, these regulations will not need to be
amended.  However, as long as Mineral Policy Center  is good
law, these regulations allow the BLM to reject projects that will
cause undue degradation on a case-by-case basis.  Whether the
BLM actually rejects projects in such a way remains to be seen.
Despite the implications of the amended right-of-way regula-
tions, the BLM’s rationale for eliminating the prudent-person
definition of the UUD standard is difficult to pin down.  The
BLM completely ignored Mineral Policy Center  in the publica-
tion of the final 2005 right-of-way regulations, even though that
opinion was directly contradictory with the prudent-person stan-
dard.221  The BLM ironically justified completely avoiding any
definition of the statutory term “unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion”222 with the phrase “we find it to be unnecessary.”223  In
support of this reasoning, the BLM referred to requirements of
43 C.F.R. § 2804.26 that it believes are more stringent than the
UUD standard.224  The more stringent standards the BLM was
referencing are to ensure that the proposed use is consistent with
220 Id.  § 2805.11(a) (emphasis added).
221 See Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and
the Mineral Leasing Act, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,979 (acknowledging the UUD standard
was altered, but not citing Mineral Policy Center).
222 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
223 Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the
Mineral Leasing Act, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,979.
224 Id.  Specifically, those more “stringent” standards are contained in 43 C.F.R.
§ 2804.26(a) (2005).
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“the purpose for which the BLM manages the public lands” and
is in the “public interest.”225  This reasoning is arguably flawed
because the BLM could consider certain projects to be in the
public interest and be consistent with the “purpose for which the
BLM manages the public lands,” despite the fact that it would
create a level of objective environmental harm that is undue.
In any event, the BLM indicated that it “will continue to ob-
serve the ‘unnecessary or undue degradation’ standard . . . but
will allow the facts by a particular situation give meaning to this
phrase.”226  This position is consistent with that taken by the
BLM in defending its 2001 hard-rock mining UUD standard and
reluctantly approved by Mineral Policy Center .  Ultimately, the
BLM seems reluctant to bind itself to any uniform way of analyz-
ing when impacts of a proposed development constitute “undue
degradation.”227
e. The UUD Standard Today
Despite its many incarnations, the preceding background pro-
vides some guidance on what the UUD standard requires today.
First, it is clear that the standard applies to all activities author-
ized by the BLM as FLPMA itself indicates.  Second, most ra-
tional observers—and the only federal court to address the
issue—conclude that the disjunctive nature of the term “unneces-
sary or undue degradation” requires the BLM to prohibit uses
that cause degradation that is either “unnecessary” or “un-
due.”228  Actions that are “unnecessary” seem to be actions that
the typical person or operator would not undertake to complete
the proposed use.  This essentially creates a certain industry stan-
dard that must be followed, and focuses on the particular indus-
try standards at issue.  In contrast, “undue degradation” focuses
objectively on the impacts to public lands and the environment.
The BLM’s current hard-rock mining regulations and its cur-
rent right-of-way regulations essentially plan to approach the
UUD standard on a case-by-case basis.  In both regulatory con-
texts, the BLM completely fails to acknowledge that an objective
225 43 C.F.R. § 2804.26 (2006); see also Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act and the Mineral Leasing Act, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,979
(mentioning these two standards specifically).
226 Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the
Mineral Leasing Act, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,979.
227 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
228 Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2003).
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analysis of environmental impacts must be conducted to comply
with the UUD standard.  However, Mineral Policy Center  re-
mains the only federal court opinion to hold that the UUD stan-
dard requires such an analysis.229  To the extent that the BLM
disagrees,230 it would bear a heavy burden in convincing another
court that Mineral Policy Center ’s reasoning was flawed given the
clear statutory language of the phrase “unnecessary or undue
degradation.”231  Thus, parties opposed to a particular proposed
use of public lands could successfully prevent the use by proving
that the objective environmental impacts would cause “undue
degradation.”232  Such a legal challenge must be brought under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),233 and prove that the
BLM was “arbitrary and capricious” in failing to prevent undue
degradation.234
The BLM’s decision to ignore the requirement to make an ob-
jective analysis of the impacts under the UUD standard in the
regulations could result in ignorance at the project-specific level.
As a result, the BLM could theoretically permit projects that are
in violation of the UUD standard.  In the end, the words “undue
degradation” alone provide a weak standard for a court to deter-
mine if the BLM has acted arbitrarily.  Thus, success in court for
environmental groups would probably be limited to instances
where plaintiffs could prove the BLM completely failed to even
make an objective analysis of whether the environmental impacts
would entail undue degradation.
On the other side of the coin, failing to further define what
sort of objective environmental impacts are “undue” could pro-
vide the BLM—if it was so inclined—with substantial discretion
to deny projects proposed by industry groups.  The term “undue
degradation” could be construed to include fairly insignificant
environmental impacts.  Similar to the challenges environmental
plaintiffs would face in proving that a particular impact is undue,
industry plaintiffs may have difficulty proving the BLM arbitrary
and capricious in finding impacts undue.
229 Id.  at 42.
230 As noted, a cynical observer could construe the BLM’s actions since Mineral
Policy Center as a continued ignorance of the term “undue degradation.” See supra
note 212. R
231 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (emphasis added).
232 Id.
233 Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 1988).
234 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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In conclusion, the current status of the UUD standard pro-
vides the BLM with the maximum amount of discretion possible
under the statutory term to either approve or deny a project as it
sees fit.  Unfortunately, this leaves environmental and industry
groups with little guidance on what impacts the UUD standard
will prevent in a particular circumstance.
2. The Requirement to Minimize the Damage of Rights-of-Way
a. The Statutory Language
In addition to the UUD standard, FLPMA contains at least
one other provision that could substantially affect the regulation
of wind-energy developments to protect the environment.  That
provision requires that each authorization of a right-of-way over
public lands “contain . . . terms and conditions which will . . .
minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wild-
life habitat and otherwise protect the environment.”235  Failure to
comply with conditions imposed on such an authorization, or
with the requirements of FLPMA itself, can result in revocation
of the authorization to use the public lands.236  Similar to the
UUD standard, this requirement places a non-discretionary duty
on the BLM to take into account environmental values with the
mandatory term “shall.”  Like the UUD standard, the require-
ment to minimize damage is not facially instructive; it does not
specify how far the “terms and conditions” must go in minimizing
damage.
The authority granted to the BLM in the minimize-damage
standard is clarified by the subsequent statutory clause, providing
some insight without actually defining the minimize-damage
standard.237  While the requirement to impose terms and condi-
tions that will “minimize damage” appears in a list of non-discre-
tionary duties in section 505(a) of FLPMA, section 505(b)
provides a list of discretionary actions the BLM may take.  The
list of BLM’s discretionary authorities includes provisions that
reference adjacent or off-site lands:
235 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a) (2006).
236 Fuller, supra note 1, at 624.  The BLM has revoked authorizations to access R
public lands for wind-energy development in the past for failure to comply with the
terms of the right-of-way authorization.  S. Cal. Sunbelt Developers, Inc., 147
I.B.L.A. 266, 276 (1999).
237 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a)-(b).
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Each right-of-way shall contain . . . (b) such terms and condi-
tions as the Secretary concerned deems necessary to . . . (ii)
manage efficiently the lands which are subject to the right-of-
way or adjacent thereto and protect the other lawful users of
the lands adjacent to or traversed by such right-of-way . . . (iv)
protect the interests of individuals living in the general area
traversed by the right-of-way who rely on the fish, wildlife,
and other biotic resources of the area for subsistence pur-
poses; (v) require location of the right-of-way along a route
that will cause least damage to the environment, taking into
consideration feasibility and other relevant factors. . . .238
The authority to protect “adjacent” lands and the “interests of
individuals living in the general area” who rely on wildlife argua-
bly enables the BLM to look beyond the immediate vicinity of
the right-of-way in analyzing and mitigating its impacts.  As such,
the BLM could impose off-site mitigation to protect fish and
wildlife in the general area and lands adjacent to the proposed
development.  However, unlike the requirement to minimize
damage, these authorities are discretionary.  They also do not ex-
plicitly implicate off-site mitigation.
b. Relevant Interpretations in Other Statutory Contexts
The term “minimize” exists in at least three other regulatory
contexts, each of which provides guidance on its meaning in the
right-of-way context.
First, the term “minimize” is associated with off-site mitigation
in the Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) regulations
under NEPA.239  NEPA requires the analysis of science and pol-
icy in major federal actions that will have a significant impact on
the environment.240  The analysis must follow regulations
promulgated by the CEQ.241  In turn, those CEQ regulations re-
quire the decision-making agency to “[s]tate whether all practica-
ble means to avoid or minimize  environmental harm from the
alternative selected have been adopted.”242  In the effort to en-
sure harm is avoided or minimized, “[a] monitoring and enforce-
ment program shall be adopted and summarized where
applicable for any mitigation .”243  Later, the CEQ regulations de-
238 Id.  § 1765(b).
239 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2006) (providing CEQ definition of mitigation).
240 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)-(C) (2006).
241 Id. § 4332(2)(B).
242 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
243 Id. (emphasis added).
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fine “mitigation” to include “compensating for the impact by re-
placing or providing substitute resources or environments.”244
Thus, the CEQ regulations include compensatory mitigation,
presumably conducted off-site, among the ways to “avoid or min-
imize” environmental harm of a proposed project.
Second, the requirement to “minimize damage” has been ap-
plied in the Clean Water Act.  Section 301(a) of the Clean Water
Act prohibits unpermitted discharges of pollutants, including
dredge or fill materials, into “waters of the United States.”245
However, section 404(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act authorizes
the Corps of Engineers to permit discharges of dredge or fill
materials in accordance with “guidelines developed by” the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA).246  In turn, the EPA’s sec-
tion 404(b)(1) guidelines require the Corps to “minimize” the
unavoidable impacts of such discharges to the environment.247
Under the EPA’s mandate to “minimize” the impact to the envi-
ronment, the Corps requires dischargers to mitigate for impacts
to dredged or filled wetlands.248  The Corps permits the compen-
satory mitigation to be conducted on-site or off-site according to
244 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20(e) (2006).  Along with compensatory mitigation, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.20 includes avoidance of the impacts, minimization of the project, restoration,
and reduction by preservation during the life of the project. Id. § 1508.20(a)-(d).
245 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
246 Id.  § 1344(b).
247 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (2006).  However, the Corps is required to avoid the
discharge altogether if there is a practicable alternative. Id. § 230.10(a).  The Corps
may only minimize impacts if it first determines that the impacts are unavoidable.
See also Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material,
45 Fed. Reg. 85,336, 85,339-40 (Dec. 24, 1980) (discussing the guidelines).
248 The guidelines do authorize the use of “habitat development and restoration
. . . to compensate for destroyed habitat” as a means of minimizing impacts.  40
C.F.R. § 230.75(d) (2006).  However, the term “mitigation” does not appear in the
guidelines. See generally id.  The Corps derives “mitigation” from the mandate to
“minimize” impacts with the acquiescence of the EPA in accordance with a Memo-
randum of Agreement.  Clean Water Act, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210, 9210 (Mar. 12, 1990).
That Agreement recognizes mitigation of a discharge’s impacts as a legitimate
means of “minimizing” the impact in accordance with the EPA’s Clean Water Act
section 404(b)(1) guidelines. Id. at 9210-12.  Recently, the Corps and the EPA have
taken steps to make the wetlands mitigation program more official by proposing a
rule to govern the program. See  Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic
Resources, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,520, 15,520-24 (proposed Mar. 28, 2006) (providing a
summary of the proposed rulemaking).  Wetlands with a “significant nexus” to navi-
gable waters are within the jurisdiction of the Corps and the EPA under the Clean
Water Act.  Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2241 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (2006); see also  N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1025
(9th Cir. 2006) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the controlling opinion
in Rapanos).
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a hierarchy established by the EPA and the Corps.249  Thus, the
Corps has interpreted its mandate to “minimize” damage as pro-
viding it with the authority, and perhaps the duty, to require dis-
chargers to engage in compensatory mitigation, oftentimes off-
site.  The EPA has acquiesced in this interpretation of the re-
quirement to “minimize” damage.
Third, the ESA contains a “minimize and mitigate” require-
ment.  Section 10 of the ESA authorizes the Fish and Wildlife
Service to issue permits to incidentally take a limited number of
an endangered or threatened species.250  However, the Fish and
Wildlife Service must condition permits on compliance with a
habitat conservation plan that specifies the “steps the applicant
will take to minimize and mitigate” the impacts of the taking.251
Federal courts have approved of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
use of many forms of mitigation, including compensatory, off-site
mitigation, to “minimize and mitigate” the effects of a taking.252
Therefore, FLPMA’s requirement to “minimize damage” to
the environment does not appear on an empty slate like its UUD
standard.  The CEQ regulations,253 the Corps of Engineers’ wet-
lands mitigation program,254 and the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
habitat mitigation program255 provide a persuasive indication
that FLPMA’s requirement to “minimize damage” also autho-
rizes or requires the BLM to follow a similar hierarchy of options
in approving rights-of-way across federal lands.
c. Court Decisions Addressing the Requirement to Minimize
Damage
Two recent court decisions have provided substantial insight
into the BLM’s legal authority and obligation to “minimize dam-
age” to the environment in granting rights-of-way.  First, in
County of Okanogan v. National Marine Fisheries Service ,256 the
249 Clean Water Act, 55 Fed. Reg. at 9210-12.
250 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
251 Id.  § 1539(a)(2)(A)-(B).
252 See, e.g. , Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 202 F.
Supp. 2d 594, 596-625 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (approving a plan that relies on off-site
mitigation and citing similar cases).
253 See  40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2006) (providing CEQ definition of mitigation).
254 See  Clean Water Act, 55 Fed. Reg. at 9210 (stating the mitigation program).
255 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity , 202 F. Supp. 2d at 596-625 (describing the
mitigation program).
256 County of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.
2003).
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Ninth Circuit examined whether the minimize-damage standard
authorized the U.S. Forest Service to require a minimum in-
stream flow to protect fish as a condition on a right-of-way to
access a water diversion.257  Shortly thereafter, in Trout Unlim-
ited v. U.S. Department of Agriculture ,258 the District of Colo-
rado examined whether the minimize-damage standard required
the Forest Service to condition a similar right-of-way on an in-
stream flow of water to protect fish.  While the decisions dealt
with the Forest Service, not the BLM, they are relevant to BLM
activities because both agencies are subject to FLPMA’s mini-
mize-damage standard.259
County of Okanogan  recognized the broad authority created
by FLPMA’s requirement to “minimize damage.”  The plaintiffs
possessed state-law water rights predating FLPMA by almost a
century.260  To access the diversion facilities and maintain their
water rights, they needed access across national forest lands.261
Beginning in 1903, the plaintiffs had a series of contractual agree-
ments and special-use permits with the Department of the Inte-
rior and the Forest Service, which permitted access.262  Each of
these agreements allowed the government to revoke or alter the
access at its discretion.263  Because the stream contained three
ESA-listed fish species—chinook salmon, steelhead, and bull
trout—the Forest Service had to consult with the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) before renewing the special-
use permit.264
This consultation resulted in significant controversy.  The
NMFS concluded that the right-of-way would “jeopardize” the
257 Id.  at 1084-86.
258 Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004).
259 See County of Okanogan , 347 F.3d at 1085 (“The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) authorizes the Secretaries of the Interior and
Agriculture to ‘grant, issue, or renew rights-of-way over [public lands] . . . .”) (quot-
ing 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1) (2000)); see also FLYNN, supra note 121, at 824 (“With the R
passage of FLPMA . . . Congress gave the Department of [the] Interior, and to a
lesser extent the Department of Agriculture, broad authority over the uses of public
land.).  Flynn also provides an extensive analysis of County of Okanogan and Trout
Unlimited  and concludes that their implications are “far-reaching.” FLYNN, supra
note 121, at 824-29. R
260 County of Okanogan , 347 F.3d at 1082-83.
261 Id.
262 Id.  at 1082.
263 Id.  at 1082-83.
264 Id.  at 1083-84.  The interagency consultation requirements of the ESA are
found at 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
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existence of chinook salmon and steelhead because it would en-
able the plaintiffs to de-water the stream, requiring the NMFS to
propose “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to avoid jeop-
ardy.265  To protect these species, the NMFS proposed a mini-
mum instream-flow requirement as a condition on the special-use
permit authorizing the right-of-way access.266  In response, the
plaintiffs challenged the condition as exceeding the statutory au-
thority of both the NMFS and Forest Service.267  The Ninth Cir-
cuit first established that several statutes, including the minimize-
damage standard in FLPMA’s right-of-way provisions, enabled
the Forest Service to restrict access to the diversion when water
levels dropped to protect endangered fish.268  The Ninth Circuit
held that imposing such a restriction as a condition on the right-
of-way to access the water-diversion facilities was legal.269  In re-
jecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the Forest Service was regu-
lating an activity beyond the scope of the right-of-way itself, the
Ninth Circuit stated, “[T]he pending case ‘is not a controversy
over water rights, but over rights-of-way through lands of the
United States, which is a different matter, and is so treated in the
right-of-way acts before mentioned.’”270  The U.S. Supreme
Court denied the plaintiffs petition for certiorari.271
As such, the Ninth Circuit approved a broad authority to im-
pose conditions on activities that the right-of-way would enable,
not just on the physical act of traveling over public lands.  How-
ever, the case could be construed as applying only to the some-
what limited circumstance where an endangered species is likely
265 County of Okanogan , 347 F.3d at 1084.
266 Id.
267 Id.  at 1085.  The plaintiffs also challenged the instream-flow condition as an
unconstitutional “take” of their Fifth Amendment property interest in access to the
water rights. Id.  The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument because the water right
had always been subject to government restrictions. Id.
268 Id.  In addition to FLPMA’s authorization to “minimize damage” caused by
rights-of-way, the Ninth Circuit also relied on: another FLPMA provision, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1761(a)(1) (2000); the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1604(g)(3)(A)-(B) (2000); the Organic Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000);
and the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000). Id.
269 County of Okanogan , 347 F.3d at 1086.
270 Id.  (quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 411
(1917)). Utah Power & Light Co.  approved of the federal government’s regulation
of the use of rights-of-way over federal land to access an energy project on a river,
even though the project predated right-of-way enactments by Congress and local
regulations governed the use of water on the particular federal land.  243 U.S. at 411.
271 County of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 541 U.S. 1029 (2004).
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to become extinct, without imposing mitigation measures on the
harmful activity that access enables.
Trout Unlimited  extends the reasoning of the County of Oka-
nogan opinion to find a broad non-discretionary duty to “mini-
mize damage” in granting rights-of-way.  Like County of
Okanogan , Trout Unlimited  involved the renewal of a special-use
permit to store and access water in a reservoir on national forest
lands, which implicated FLPMA’s right-of-way provisions.272
Also similar, the reservoir at issue in Trout Unlimited , Long
Draw Reservoir in the Roosevelt National Forest in Colorado,
had been in operation before passage of FLPMA and impaired
flows to a tributary of the Cache La Poudre River, which con-
tained endangered-fish species.273  However, unlike County of
Okanogan , the plaintiffs in Trout Unlimited were environmental
groups, and they challenged the Forest Service’s failure to condi-
tion the right-of-way authorization on an instream flow to protect
the fish.274  The prior permits authorizing use of the reservoir did
not impose instream flows, but the applicable Land and Re-
source Management Plan required the Forest Service to impose
“bypass flows” during winter months in future permits.275  Addi-
tionally, unlike County of Okanogan , no federal agencies had de-
termined that the fish species would be in jeopardy of extinction
if an instream flow condition were not included in the right-of-
way authorization.
In the process of renewing the permits to access and use na-
tional forest land for the reservoir, the Forest Service produced
an environmental-impact statement (EIS).276  Among the four al-
ternatives analyzed in the EIS, Alternative B provided for only
“voluntary” bypass flows in winter months, and Alternative C
provided for mandatory bypass of natural-flow amounts in winter
months.277  The environmental plaintiffs advocated for Alterna-
tive C, mandatory-bypass flows.278  When the Forest Service se-
lected the voluntary-bypass flow option, the plaintiffs sued,




275 Id. at 1095-97.
276 Id. at 1096.
277 Id.
278 Id.  at 1097.
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alleging violations of FLPMA’s right-of-way provisions.279  In de-
fending its position that voluntary-bypass flows would “minimize
damage” to fish, the Forest Service reasoned that it had properly
balanced the interests of fish against the interests in diverting
water.280  The district court disagreed with this reading of
FLPMA and held that the Forest Service violated the APA when
it balanced interests under the minimize-damage standard.281
“[FLPMA] simply does not allow a forest supervisor to ignore
options that would minimize environmental degradation because
of the costs to private parties and difficulty in implementa-
tion.”282  Thus, the court held that the requirement to “minimize
damage” means what it says.  Among a group of reasonable al-
ternatives, the one with the minimum amount of damage must be
selected, regardless of which reasonable alternative is most prof-
itable for private parties.  The Tenth Circuit recently dismissed
the appeal of the decision, holding that appellate jurisdiction did
not exist because the district court had remanded the record of
decision to the Forest Service for proper application of
FLPMA.283
Trout Unlimited could significantly increase the role of the
minimize-damage standard in governing access to public lands
for private gain.  The holding is significant because it enables en-
vironmental groups opposed to a particular use of public lands to
stop the use by proving there is a reasonable alternative that is
less environmentally damaging.  Under Trout Unlimited , the
presence of an endangered species that will be “jeopardized” by
the activity is not required to prove such damage.  However, the
279 The plaintiffs also alleged violations of NEPA, the Forest and Rangeland Re-
newable Resources Planning Act, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Id. at 1097-
98.  However, the court denied each of these claims. Id. at 1109-15.
280 Id.  at 1107.
281 Id.  at 1108.
282 Id.  The district court noted that even if balancing was permitted by FLPMA,
the interests balanced in favor of mandatory-bypass flows because the mandatory-
bypass flows would not prevent the effective use of the permittees’ reservoir system.
Id.
283 Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 441 F.3d 1214, 1217-20 (10th Cir.
2006).  Interestingly, only the defendant-intervenors argued for appellate jurisdic-
tion, with both the Forest Service and the plaintiffs arguing that appellate jurisdic-
tion did not exist. Id. at 1218.  The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the defendant-
intervenors had not demonstrated the appeal was “urgent and important,” as was
required to appeal an order of remand, because they presented no evidence that the
Forest Service would impose the mandatory-bypass flow requirement pending reso-
lution of the remand. Id. at 1219 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).
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Trout Unlimited opinion cited several smoking guns in the ad-
ministrative record that proved the fish species involved would
be damaged much more by the voluntary-bypass alternative than
by the mandatory-bypass alternative.284  In sum, under Trout Un-
limited , environmental plaintiffs can successfully challenge uses
of public land that require a right-of-way authorization if they
have clear evidence that the proposed use will damage fish or
wildlife and can show there is a less damaging alternative.
B. Analysis of the Legality of the BLM’s Policies
for Wind-Energy Mitigation
The BLM’s fairly limited view of its power to regulate wind-
energy development may be inconsistent with its legal authority
and duty to protect the environment under FLPMA.  While the
Agency intends to impose mandatory on-site BMPs upon wind-
energy developers, it also states that it will consider off-site miti-
gation of unavoidable impacts only if the applicant volunteers to
perform mitigation.285  Apparently, the voluntary off-site mitiga-
tion policy is applicable even when the impacts cannot be ade-
quately mitigated with on-site BMPs.286  The BLM’s justification
for such a policy is that it believes its authority to require off-site
mitigation is limited.287  The BLM’s position on off-site mitiga-
tion thus questions the BLM’s ultimate regulatory authority and
discretion in approving wind-energy developments on public
lands.  The following analysis will focus on off-site mitigation to
determine just how far the BLM’s regulatory authority and dis-
cretion reaches.
284 The Trout Unlimited court found overwhelming evidence in the administrative
record that the mandatory-bypass alternative would result in the least damage to
fish populations.  First,
[t]he Forest Plan suggests that the Forest Service determined that the most
appropriate way to minimize damage to fish habitat is to maintain such
habitat at least at 40 percent or more of potential, requiring the Forest
Service to ‘manage waters capable of supporting self-sustaining trout popu-
lations to provide for those populations.’”
320 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (quoting the Forest Plan).  Additionally, the record of deci-
sion confirmed this conclusion by indicating that bypass flows were the least envi-
ronmentally harmful alternative. Id. at 1107. Finally, the scientific evidence in the
record indicated that fish were smaller and less abundant in the area where the dam
resulted in low or nonexistent winter flows. Id.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 108-20. R
286 See supra text accompanying notes 108-11. R
287 Id.
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1. The UUD Standard’s Implications for Wind-Energy
Development
The UUD standard has the potential to require the BLM to
impose broad regulatory restrictions on wind-energy develop-
ment.  The BLM plans to regulate wind-energy developments by
approving or denying plans of development submitted in pursuit
of a grant of a right-of-way, which would be governed by the
BLM’s right-of-way regulations.288  Whether the BLM agrees or
not, the Mineral Policy Center court read the term “unnecessary
or undue degradation”289 to obligate the BLM to prevent “undue
degradation,” even if such degradation is necessary or would typ-
ically occur using prudent-industry standards.290  This obligation
was ignored in the prudent-person standard in the old right-of-
way regulations, which followed the reasoning of the 1980 hard-
rock mining regulations.291  Consequently, the BLM’s elimina-
tion of the prudent-person standard in its 2005 amendments to its
right-of-way regulations implicitly acknowledges that the pru-
dent-person standard was an impermissibly narrow reading of
the statutory UUD standard.292  At the very least, removal of the
prudent-person standard indicates that the BLM thought it stood
on shaky ground and did not want to defend it in court.
In any event, a court would be unlikely to hold that the term
“unnecessary or undue degradation” does not prevent “undue
degradation” after Mineral Policy Center , particularly given such
clear statutory language.293  As such, the BLM has an obligation,
not only to impose prudent-industry standards, but also to objec-
tively analyze the amount of overall degradation for each wind-
energy proposal and determine if undue degradation is likely.
However, the BLM’s 2005 right-of-way regulations, like its 2001
hard-rock mining regulations, indicate the Agency plans to ap-
proach the term “undue” on a case-by-case basis rather than pro-
288 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  Every right-of-way issued must R
contain terms and conditions consistent with the BLM’s right-of-way regulations.  43
U.S.C. § 1765(a) (2006).
289 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
290 See supra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text. R
292 See supra text accompanying notes 216-28. R
293 See supra text accompanying notes 204-19.
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viding further regulatory clarification.294  This leaves uncertainty
as to when “undue degradation” exists.
Even the BLM seems to agree that it has the authority to im-
pose reasonable BMPs on wind-energy developers because pru-
dent-industry standards fall within the requirement to prevent
unnecessary degradation.  Presuming that the BMPs in the PEIS
and Record of Decision are reasonable industry standards, the
BLM clearly has the authority to impose those BMPs.  Indeed,
the Agency would have been required to impose those BMPs
even under the narrow prudent-person standard.
The trickier question is whether the BLM’s voluntary off-site
mitigation policy is a legal implementation of the UUD standard.
At first blush, the general rule that off-site mitigation must be
voluntary on the part of the applicant seems to conflict with Min-
eral Policy Center.  If the degradation caused after implementa-
tion of all reasonable on-site BMPs is still undue, whatever that
may mean, Mineral Policy Center stands for the proposition that
the BLM must prevent the undue degradation.295  The BLM
could only prevent undue degradation by denying the permit or
imposing further conditions, like off-site mitigation.  The
mandatory on-site BMPs in the PEIS and Record of Decision
do not indicate that the BLM will actually deny any sites for de-
velopment.296  Carried to the logical extreme, the permissive on-
site BMPs and the voluntary off-site mitigation policy could re-
sult in approval of a project where on-site mitigation with BMPs
fails to prevent undue degradation and the developer does not
volunteer off-site mitigation.  As such, truly imposing off-site
mitigation only “voluntarily” would eventually result in a viola-
tion of the UUD standard.
However, if the Agency is willing to actually deny a right-of-
way permit to develop a wind farm, the voluntary off-site mitiga-
tion policy can be squared with Mineral Policy Center  because it
recognizes that voluntary off-site mitigation is merely the general
294 The 2005 right-of-way regulations eliminated the prior regulatory definition of
“unnecessary or undue degradation” to “allow the facts posed by a particular situa-
tion [to] give meaning to this phrase.”  Rights-of-Way Under the Federal Land Pol-
icy and Management Act and the Mineral Leasing Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,970, 20,979
(Apr. 22, 2005).
295 See supra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
296 See supra text accompanying notes 87-94.  For an example of the extreme en- R
vironmental impacts of wind energy at some locations, see supra Part I.A.2.a.
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rule.297  Despite the general rule, the BLM Off-Site Mitigation
Guidance recognizes that “there are circumstances where negoti-
ation would be appropriate.”298  Presumably, the negotiation
would entail the BLM informing the applicant that undue degra-
dation will occur even with all reasonable on-site BMPs, and the
right-of-way permit will be denied without voluntary off-site mit-
igation to bring the degradation below the undue level.  The de-
veloper would then be faced with the choice of having the permit
denied and forgoing the opportunity to develop a wind farm, or
volunteering off-site mitigation.  While implementing the policy
in this way would comply with the UUD standard, it is hardly
voluntary.
Further confusing the regulatory scheme, the BLM’s failure to
clarify the word “undue” gives wind-energy developers and those
opposed to the negative impacts of wind energy on public lands
little guidance on what magnitude of degradation could require
off-site mitigation.  If discontented with the result, groups op-
posed to the BLM’s decision regarding a particular wind-energy
development would have a difficult time proving the Agency’s
application of the term “undue” violated the APA.299  So long as
the BLM can show it has considered whether the damage was
“undue,” the Agency is likely to prevail in court.
2. The Regulatory Power to Minimize Damage Caused by
Wind-Energy Developments
The requirement to “minimize damage” to the environment300
is the provision of FLPMA most likely to authorize or compel
the BLM to require extensive regulatory conditions of wind-en-
ergy developers, particularly mitigation measures.  In the regula-
tory contexts of NEPA, the Clean Water Act, and the ESA,
agencies and courts have interpreted the term “minimize” to cre-
ate a hierarchy of mitigation measures.301  This suggests that at
bare minimum, reasonable on-site mitigation measures are re-
quired.  Consequently, the “minimize damage” standard, like the
UUD standard, requires the BLM to impose reasonable on-site
297 See supra notes 106-19 and accompanying text. R
298 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-069, supra note
106, at 5. R
299 See supra text accompanying notes 233-35. R
300 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a)(ii) (2006).
301 See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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mitigation such as its mandatory on-site BMPs.302  Additionally,
when on-site mitigation is inadequate, the hierarchy of mitigation
requires off-site mitigation in the other statutory schemes and ar-
guably in FLPMA as well.
Indeed, assuming that County of Okanogan303  and, more im-
portantly, Trout Unlimited,304  are not overruled, the “minimize
damage” standard places even broader non-discretionary duties
upon the BLM than the UUD standard with regard to off-site
mitigation.  In Trout Unlimited , the Forest Service tried to ap-
prove a right-of-way that imposed a condition of “voluntary by-
pass” flows to protect fish.305  However, the Colorado District
Court held voluntary-bypass flows inadequate when the adminis-
trative record clearly illustrated that mandatory-bypass flows
would better “minimize damage” to fish.306  Analogously, the
BLM’s policy of only requiring off-site mitigation of the impacts
caused by wind-energy facilities on a voluntary basis is likely to
be inadequate when implementation of a project with reasonable
on-site BMPs alone still results in extreme environmental harm.
Like the mandatory-bypass flows contemplated in Trout Unlim-
ited , off-site mitigation of the unavoidable on-site impacts of a
wind-energy facility may “minimize damage” to wildlife and the
environment. If the Forest Service must require decreased water
use several decades after perfection of a state-law water right, the
BLM surely must impose the similar condition of off-site mitiga-
tion on a new wind-energy proposal with significant ecological
impacts.
Under Trout Unlimited , if the administrative record regarding
a particular wind-energy proposal indicates that mandatory off-
site mitigation would “minimize damage” to wildlife and the en-
vironment more effectively than other alternatives, the Agency
must require off-site mitigation.  The alternatives that would
need to be denied could include future voluntary off-site mitiga-
tion or the on-site BMPs analyzed in the PEIS and adopted in
the Record of Decision.307  Neither of these alternatives would
302 See supra text accompanying notes 87-94. R
303 County of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.
2003).
304 Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004).
305 See supra notes 272-84 and accompanying text. R
306 Trout Unlimited , 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08.
307 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. R
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“minimize damage” when compared to mandatory off-site miti-
gation measures.
However, the BLM’s voluntary off-site mitigation policy can
be squared with Trout Unlimited  for the same reasons it can be
squared with Mineral Policy Center .  Since the BLM recognizes
exceptions to its general policy of only requiring off-site mitiga-
tion on a voluntary basis,308 the BLM could “negotiate” for off-
site mitigation at a wind-energy development when it determines
doing so would be necessary to “minimize damage.”
In any event, the determination that off-site mitigation would
“minimize damage” could be a foregone conclusion, particularly
if there are significant environmental impacts.  As discussed
above, there will always be some unavoidable ecological impacts
caused by wind-energy development on public lands.  Unless the
facility is placed in an already industrialized or severely degraded
portion of BLM land, it is likely to cause some avian mortality,
break up habitat for sage grouse or other migratory species, or
have some physical impact on otherwise undeveloped land.309
Off-site mitigation will always provide the opportunity to lessen
the overall impact on wildlife and the environment.  Conse-
quently, off-site mitigation would seemingly be the alternative
that would “minimize damage” without completely denying the
proposed development.
If analyzed in every environmental evaluation of a wind-en-
ergy development proposal, the “minimize damage” standard
could make the mandatory off-site mitigation exception, ex-
pressed in the BLM Off-Site Mitigation Guidance, the general
rule.  With each proposal in which off-site mitigation is consid-
ered as an alternative, the BLM could be caught in the same trap
the Forest Service laid for itself in Trout Unlimited .310 An ad-
ministrative record would conclusively show the Agency’s chosen
alternative did not “minimize damage.”  Thus, whether analysis
of off-site mitigation occurs in an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement required by NEPA311 could be
determinative of whether off-site mitigation will be required.
On the other hand, if the environmental damage caused by a
project were significantly less than that contemplated in County
308 See supra text accompanying notes 106-14. R
309 See supra notes 23-74 and accompanying text. R
310 See supra text accompanying notes 272-85. R
311 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)-(C) (2006).
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of Okanogan and Trout Unlimited ,312 a court may construe the
“minimize damage” standard more narrowly.  This could occur
even if an off-site mitigation alternative was considered by the
Agency and contained in the record before the court, as
mandatory-bypass flows were in Trout Unlimited . For example,
a court may not require off-site mitigation to “minimize damage”
at an already degraded site with low ecological or other resource
value.  Like the UUD standard, further regulatory clarification
by the BLM could be useful to determine just how much damage
the “minimize damage” standard prohibits.
3. Can Off-Site Mitigation Be Ignored in NEPA Documents?
Perhaps recognizing that a well-developed analysis of an off-
site mitigation alternative could undermine its voluntary off-site
mitigation policy, the BLM Off-Site Mitigation Guidance pro-
poses to ignore the possibility of off-site mitigation altogether.  In
fact, the BLM Off-Site Mitigation Guidance orders BLM offi-
cials “not to carry [off-site mitigation alternatives] forward for
detailed analysis unless volunteered by the applicant.”313  As
such, there would be no administrative record indicating that off-
site mitigation would minimize the damage to wildlife when com-
pared to other options.  In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council , the Supreme Court held
that judicial review under the APA is generally limited to the
administrative record.314  Therefore, proponents of off-site miti-
312 Both County of Okanogan  and Trout Unlimited  dealt with endangered species.
See supra  text accompanying notes 264, 273. R
313 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-069, supra note
106, at 3. See also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. R
314 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519, 549-55 (1978) (discussing judicial review of agency decision-making proce-
dures).  In Vermont Yankee , the plaintiffs challenged the agency’s decision to not
analyze “energy conservation” in an EIS as an alternative to building a new power
plant.  The Supreme Court explained its rationale for not requiring the agency to
consider conservation:
Administrative consideration of evidence . . . always creates a gap between
the time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is
promulgated [and, we might add, the time the decision is judicially re-
viewed]. . . .  If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand
rehearings as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen,
some new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there
would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consum-
mated in an order that would not be subject to reopening.”
Id. at 554-55 (quoting Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Jersey City,  322 U.S. 503,
514 (1944)).
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gation would find little relief in the courts without the analysis of
an off-site mitigation alternative in the record, similar to the by-
pass-flow alternative that tripped up the Forest Service in Trout
Unlimited .315
However, proponents of off-site mitigation at a particular
wind-energy site may avoid this problem by first challenging the
BLM’s failure to analyze an alternative that incorporates
mandatory off-site mitigation under NEPA.  In order to force
such an analysis, Vermont Yankee  requires the proponents estab-
lish that off-site mitigation is not a “remote and speculative pos-
sibilit[y].”316  The use of off-site mitigation is probably not
remote or speculative given that the Washington Department of
Fish and Wildlife recommends its use in agency guidance.317  It
has also been considered at Altamont and at least one potential
site on BLM land.318  Proponents of off-site mitigation who are
able to present the BLM with off-site mitigation as an alternative
early enough in the NEPA process would likely succeed in forc-
ing analysis of off-site mitigation.319
Once a NEPA analysis is initiated, analysis of reasonable miti-
gation measures, including off-site mitigation, may actually be re-
quired, regardless of whether it is raised in the administrative
process.  In fact, the CEQ’s NEPA regulations require the alter-
natives analysis of an EIS to “[i]nclude appropriate mitigation
measures not already included in the proposed action or alterna-
315 See supra notes 272-84 and accompanying text. R
316 Vermont Yankee 435 U.S. at 551 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Mor-
ton,  458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (internal quotations omitted).
317 See supra text accompanying note 102. R
318 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. R
319 The BLM may argue that off-site mitigation should not be analyzed as an al-
ternative under NEPA because the BLM does not have the discretion to require off-
site mitigation.  Courts have held that agencies do not have to analyze alternatives,
or even go through NEPA, if they have no discretion to choose an alternative course
of action. See  Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 773 (2004) (NEPA
inapplicable because the agency had no discretion to prevent proposed action and
hence no authority to impose alternatives that may be analyzed under NEPA); see
also  South Dakota v. Andrus, 624 F.2d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 1980) (Department of
the Interior did not have to conduct a NEPA analysis comparing alternatives to issu-
ing an unrestricted mineral patent to a miner because the authority to grant the
mineral patent was not discretionary).  However, FLPMA’s UUD standard and
“minimize damage” standards clearly do authorize the BLM to impose off-site miti-
gation measures when necessary to comply with those standards.  43 U.S.C.
§ 1732(b) (2006); id.  § 1765(a)(ii).  Even if the BLM lacks the authority to require
off-site mitigation, it clearly has the authority to reject wind-energy proposals alto-
gether, making Department of Transportation and South Dakota  inapposite.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-2\OEL204.txt unknown Seq: 60 30-APR-07 9:51
504 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 21, 445
tives.”320  Additionally, the CEQ regulations also include off-site
compensatory mitigation among the hierarchy of potential miti-
gation alternatives that could be implemented and analyzed.321
Therefore, a literal reading of the CEQ regulations would re-
quire an analysis of an alternative that employs available mitiga-
tion measures, possibly including off-site mitigation.
In Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester ,322 the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the Forest Service adequately
analyzed potential mitigation measures to offset the unavoidable
impact of a proposed ski resort in the North Cascades.323  The
discussion of mitigation was “presented in very general terms,
lacking both a detailed description of required or possible mitiga-
tion measures, and any analysis as to the effectiveness of these
measures.”324  In holding the EIS’s analysis of potential mitiga-
tion measures inadequate, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Without a
complete mitigation plan, the decisionmaker is unable to make
an informed judgment as to the environmental impact of the pro-
ject—one of the main purposes of an environmental impact
statement.”325
On review of Methow Valley Citizens Alliance , the Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that the Ninth Circuit imposed a “sub-
stantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually
formulated and adopted.”326  The Court also said that “it would
be inconsistent with NEPA’s reliance on procedural mecha-
nisms—as opposed to substantive, result-based standards—to de-
mand the presence of a fully developed plan that will mitigate
environmental harm before an agency can act.”327  However, the
Court indicated that the Ninth Circuit had permissibly imposed a
320 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f) (2006). See also id.  § 1502.16(h) (requiring discussion of
“[m]eans to mitigate adverse environmental impacts (if not fully covered under
§ 1502.14(f)”)); id.  § 1508.25(b) (requiring discussion of possible mitigation mea-
sures in defining the scope of the proposed action); & id. § 1505(c) (requiring the
same in the explanation of the ultimate decision).
321 The CEQ regulations define mitigation to include “[c]ompensating for the im-
pact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.20(e) (2005).
322 Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 833 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1987),
rev’d sub nom . Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
323 Id.  at 819.
324 Id.
325 Id.  at 820 (citing Or. Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.
1987)).
326 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Alliance, 490 U.S. 332, 333 (1989).
327 Id.  (emphasis added).
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“requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail,” so
long as execution of a mitigation plan is not imposed upon the
agency by the courts.328  The Court explained that the rationale
for requiring detailed discussion of potential mitigation alterna-
tives goes to the heart of NEPA’s purpose to make agency deci-
sion making more transparent to the public:
[O]mission of a reasonably complete discussion of possible
mitigation measures would undermine the “action-forcing”
function of NEPA.  Without such a discussion, neither the
agency nor other interested groups and individuals can prop-
erly evaluate the severity of the adverse effects.  An adverse
effect that can be fully remedied by, for example, an inconse-
quential public expenditure is certainly not as serious as a sim-
ilar effect that can only be modestly ameliorated through the
commitment of vast public and private resources.329
Thus, the Supreme Court indicated that a “reasonably com-
plete discussion” of mitigation measures necessary to offset the
impact of a project is required.330
The circuit courts of appeal disagree on how strenuously an
agency’s chosen mitigation strategies should be scrutinized under
the CEQ regulations in order to comply with Methow Valley Citi-
zens Alliance .  Some circuits continue to read the CEQ regula-
tions literally by requiring agencies to discuss potential
mitigation measures in significant detail.331  Of the circuits, the
328 Id.  at 352.
329 Id.
330 The Court’s approval of the requirement to analyze mitigation is further evi-
denced by its citation to the CEQ regulations requiring and defining mitigation. Id.
at 352.  However, the Court did indicate that off-site impacts, including air-quality
degradation and impacts to mule deer habitat caused by roads and housing develop-
ments that would surely follow the proposed ski area, need not be analyzed in the
EIS. Id.  at 352-53.  Since those impacts could only be regulated by local govern-
ments and other third parties, the Forest Service did not have discretion over them.
Id. Off-site mitigation of the off-site impacts of a ski resort is distinguishable from
the possibility of requiring off-site mitigation for on-site impacts of wind-energy
developments.
331 See Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 473 (9th Cir.
2000) (requiring analysis of mitigation measures); see also Colo. Envt’l Coal. v.
Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Methow Valley Citizens Coun-
cil , 490 U.S. at 351-52) (“By statute and regulation, an environmental impact state-
ment must include a discussion of possible mitigation measures to avoid adverse
environmental impacts.”); Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1288-89
(1st Cir. 1996) (relying on the discussion of alternatives incorporating mitigation in
Methow Valley Citizens Alliance to require the Forest Service to analyze the use of
constructed retaining ponds as an alternative to the proposal of using a natural pond
for snow-making at a ski resort).
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Ninth Circuit has probably read Methow Valley Citizens Alliance
and the CEQ regulations as imposing the most onerous require-
ments on agencies:
A mitigation plan “need not be legally enforceable, funded or
even in final form to comply with NEPA’s procedural require-
ments.” . . .  We need only be satisfied that the agency took the
requisite “hard look” at the possible mitigating measures; but,
on the other hand, a “perfunctory description” is not adequate
to satisfy NEPA’s requirements.  A mere listing of mitigating
measures, without supporting analytical data, also is
inadequate.332
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has read the language in Methow
Valley Citizens Alliance  to grant the agencies broad deference in
choosing appropriate mitigation measures to discuss in an EIS.333
However, the majority of circuits seem to agree that NEPA re-
quires a reasonable discussion of mitigation.  In a situation where
on-site mitigation would be inadequate to off-set environmental
harm, an adequate EIS may legally require a discussion of off-
site mitigation measures.  In such circumstances, the BLM’s gen-
eral policy of avoiding such analysis for wind-energy proposals
may be legally indefensible.
The BLM may also be forced to conduct analysis of off-site
mitigation in a supplemental EIS if it avoided doing so in an ini-
tial EIS, ultimately delaying implementation of a project.  A sup-
plemental EIS is required whenever the Agency “makes
substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to
environmental concerns.”334  For example, imagine if the
Agency’s EIS merely analyzed a no-action alternative that would
reject the project and an alternative employing the BLM’s on-site
BMPs, without considering off-site mitigation.335  If the analysis
revealed that even with the on-site BMPs environmental harm
would be extreme, the Agency would likely be forced to reject
332 Okanogan Highlands Alliance , 236 F.3d at 473 (quoting Nat’l Parks & Conser-
vation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 681 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000); Neigh-
bors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998);
Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 1998)).
333 See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (approving the FAA’s analysis of only two alternatives, the proposal to ex-
pand a runway or deny such approval, and indicating, “NEPA not only does not
require agencies to discuss any particular mitigation plans that they might put in
place, it does not require agencies—or third parties—to effect any.”) (citing Methow
Valley Citizens Alliance , 490 U.S. at 353 n.16).
334 40 C.F.R § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (2006).
335 See supra text accompanying notes 86-94. R
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the project under the UUD standard for the extreme objective
environmental harm.336
In response, the developer may “volunteer” off-site mitigation
to try to bring the project within the acceptable level of overall
harm.337  The BLM would thus analyze the off-site mitigation
proposal in a supplemental EIS because off-site mitigation would
be a “substantial change in the proposed action.”338  In such a
situation, the developer may be delayed for a significant time
while the supplemental EIS is prepared, subjected to public com-
ment, and finalized.339  As such, the BLM’s policy of not analyz-
ing off-site mitigation could cause undue delays for wind-energy
developments that would cause undue degradation.340  Since the
term “undue degradation” is both statutorily ambiguous and un-
defined by the BLM,341 prudent wind-energy developers may
wish to “volunteer” economically feasible off-site mitigation to
avoid delays caused by a supplemental EIS.  Of course, as dis-
cussed above, this may result in the off-site mitigation alternative




FLPMA’s requirements to prevent “unnecessary or undue
degradation” and “minimize damage” to the environment343 will
require the BLM to impose more onerous regulations than the
baseline on-site BMPs in its programmatic wind-energy policy
for many wind-energy developments.  In such cases, the BLM
will have a duty to either deny a proposed wind-energy develop-
336 Altamont Wind Resource Area may be an example of an existing site that
would violate the UUD standard without off-site mitigation. See supra notes 52-61 R
and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.1 (concluding that the UUD stan-
dard would require rejection of proposals that cause excessive environmental harm).
337 See supra text accompanying notes 106-19. R
338 40 C.F.R § 1502.9(c)(1)(i).
339 A supplemental EIS must go through the same public process as a draft EIS.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2006) (requiring inter-agency and public comment on a draft
EIS before it is finalized); id.  § 1502.9(c)(4) (requiring supplements to be prepared
and circulated in the same fashion as drafts).
340 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
341 See supra Part II.B.1.
342 See supra text accompanying notes 304-08. R
343 See  43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006) (unnecessary or undue degradation); id.
§ 1765(a) (minimize damage).
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ment, or impose additional non-voluntary and perhaps off-site
mitigation measures to decrease environmental damage to an ac-
ceptable level.  At this point, the level of harm that would trigger
the need for additional mitigation measures is difficult to deter-
mine because the BLM has not defined the statutory terms.
The BLM could decrease the risk of delaying projects with liti-
gation and more faithfully implement its statutory obligations by
requiring wind-energy developers to completely mitigate impacts
with a mandatory, off-site mitigation program.  Such a program
should further define the statutory terms “undue degradation”
and “minimize damage” to provide wind-energy developers and
other interested parties with an idea of how much harm is per-
missible.  By doing so, the BLM may ultimately achieve substan-
tial increases in alternative-energy production on public lands as
envisioned in President Bush’s National Energy Policy, while at
the same time implement its statutory obligation to prevent envi-
ronmental harm more effectively.
